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AidWatch 2026

Europe's Changing International Cooperation: What ODA Trends Reveal

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Since 2005, CONCORD's AidWatch reports have provided information, analysis, and recommendations on the quantity and quality of aid provided by the EU and its Member States. Through the AidWatch initiative, CONCORD's members hold EU decision-makers to account on their Official Development Assistance (ODA) commitments, including the longstanding target of allocating 0.7% of Gross National Income (GNI) to ODA. This is achieved through advocacy, research and media activities on a wide range of aid-related issues throughout the year.

WHAT DO WE DO TO ACHIEVE TRANSFORMATIVE CHANGE?

Engage **Challenge** **Innovate** **Evolve**

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List of charts

List of abbreviations

ADA	Austrian Development Agency
AECID	Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation
BMZ	Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
CPA	Country Programmable Aid
CRS	Creditor Reporting System
CSO(s)	Civil Society Organisation(s)
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (of the OECD)
DCD	Development Co-operation Directorate (of the OECD)
EC	European Commission
ECA(s)	Export Credit Agency/Agencies
EU	European Union
EU MS	European Union Member States
EUR	Euro
FCA(s)	Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries
FEDES	Spanish Sustainable Development Fund
GNI	Gross National Income
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HDI	Human Development Index
IDRC	In-Donor Refugee Costs
LDC(s)	Least Developed Countries
LLD	Locally Led Development
NCQG	New Collective Quantified Goal
NGDO(s)	Non Governmental Development Organisations
NGO(s)	Non Governmental Organisations
MS	Member States
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PCSD	Policy Coherence for Sustainable Development
PPP	Public Private Partnerships
PSI(s)	Private Sector Instrument(s)
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
TOSSD	Total Official Support for Sustainable Development

Contents

1. Context: a chance to renew global solidarity and make every euro count

Official Development Assistance (ODA) is an important expression of global solidarity. *"55% of people worldwide believe their country should cooperate on global challenges even if it means compromising on national interests".*[1]

Despite the calls for more solidarity, **EU ODA is declining sharply,** with historic cuts from both EU Member States (MS) and EU Institutions. Over the past 7 years only three to four EU MS have met the 0.7% target, while countries like Belgium, Germany, France, Sweden and the Netherlands has announced further cuts.[2] These cuts are already affecting people in Majority World countries[3], and could have **negative consequences in the EU.**[4] At the same time, the scope of what counts as ODA continues to broaden. Our research found that in 2025, **22% of reported EU ODA was inflated,** which means that **more than one in five euro counted as ODA did not reach Majority World countries.**[5] As a result, **the actual amounts of public resources available for poverty and inequalities reduction are lower** than the official figures. There are also two other ways in which the **MS and EU Institutions are diluting ODA added value:**

→ **ODA is being more openly used to achieve mutual benefit and advance strategic EU and MS interests,** such as migration management, economic security, geopolitical influence and private investment mobilisation.[6] This approach risks subordinating core development objectives to broader strategic agendas, shifting decision-making away from Majority World countries' priorities and reducing the capacity of ODA to address poverty, inequalities and humanitarian needs.[7]

→ **EU ODA is concentrated in a few countries,** with Ukraine absorbing an exceptionally large share. In 2025, EU Institutions disbursed 65.2% more to Ukraine than in 2024. This is crowding out support for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Fragile and Conflict Affected Countries (FCAs).[8]

This policy brief aims to **give a preliminary assessment of the quality and quantity of EU ODA in 2025** and **suggests recommendations** to refocus ODA towards its original purpose: the economic development and welfare of Majority World countries and poverty and inequality reduction.

1 See FPIF (2026), Around the world, global solidarity and cooperation are remarkably popular.

2 See OECD (2026), ODA projections for 2026 and the near-term, June 2026.

3 While the term "Majority World" is not a classification used by the OECD DAC, UN statistical system, or EU institutions, CONCORD has decided to use this term instead of partner countries or Global South countries to avoid terminology that frames them primarily through a deficit, wealth or dependency lens.

4 The suspension of refugee recognition in Uganda, for example, could fuel refugee flows to Europe. See Uganda stops granting refugee status for Eritreans, Somalis and Ethiopians, The Guardian, 4 December 2025.

5 See AidWatch Report 2025 and previous editions.

6 See Bahí, A., R. Dom, N. Poitiers and C. Reverdy (2026), Between values and interests: drivers of European Union aid, Working Paper 13/2026, Bruegel, available at https://doi.org/10.64153/JXET9395.

7 The OECD DAC Peer Review of the EU (2025) highlights the challenge of balancing the EU's growing focus on geopolitical and strategic interests with poverty reduction and human development objectives. Bruegel's 2026 Working Paper 13/2026 op.cit. similarly finds that, while EU aid remains poverty-focused, foreign policy considerations are becoming increasingly influential in shaping EU development cooperation.

8 See OECD DAC (2026), Preliminary April Data, p. 3.

2. EU Member States and EU Institutions ODA falls to its lowest in years

Between 2024 and 2025, EU ODA decreased by 11.4% in real terms.[9] Cuts spread across most MS were the main driver of the decline. In previous years support from the EU Institutions helped to offset cuts from MS, but this was no longer the case in 2025.[10] **Besides, in spite of giving 47% of global ODA, neither EU Institutions nor MS can credibly claim global leadership on sustainable development while cutting their ODA.**[11]

MS have decreased their ODA steadily since the 2022 peak, which was influenced by exceptional factors such as a higher reporting of in-donor refugee costs (IDRC).[12] **In 2025, trends varied across MS,** with some implementing deep cuts (Ireland, Germany and Belgium) and Six Increasing ODA (Sweden, Hungary, Spain, Denmark, Luxembourg and Italy). In 2025, **EU Institutions' ODA fell by 13.8% compared to 2024 levels,** the biggest decline in a decade.[13]

Chart 1. The evolution of EU ODA allocations (2018–2025, grant equivalent, EUR million, constant)



Sources: Authors based on OECD data explorer; preliminary ODA 2026.

9 EU ODA refers to ODA from EU Institutions and EU MS combined. EU MS always refers to EU DAC and non-DAC countries unless stated otherwise. Currently the EU Institutions and twenty-three (23) EU MS are also DAC members.

10 This analysis is based on the preliminary data published by the OECD DAC on 9 April 2026 as well as a data set provided by the OECD's DCD Secretariat at the end of April, which both contain a high proportion of estimates.

11 See OECD DAC (2025), preliminary figures.

12 For further details see analysis of IDRC at 3.3 below.

13 See OECD, Modernising official development assistance (ODA), OECD.

ODA as a share of Gross National Income (GNI) dropped from 0.47% in 2024 to 0.42% in 2025. **This is the third consecutive decrease since the 2022 peak,** reaching its lowest point since 2018.

Only **Luxembourg, Sweden and Denmark met or exceeded the 0.7% target in 2025.**[14] Most MS remained well below 0.3% with Czechia, Bulgaria, Greece, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania even below 0.15%. Only six countries increased their ratio (Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain, Sweden).[15]

Chart 2. ODA/GNI ratio for EU MS 2025



Source: Authors, based on OECD data explorer; preliminary ODA 2026

14 Together with Norway, these were the only four DAC members to achieve the target.

15 In some of them, however, this was to a large extent due to technical issues (such as reporting a large multi-year credit to the Green Climate Fund in Sweden) or increasing in-donor refugee costs in Spain.

3. Inflated ODA reported by EU MS and Institutions

Glossary: How do EU MS weaken ODA integrity?

For further details on what these different costs entail, please consult the AidWatch 2025 report, pages 29 – 50

→ **In-donor refugee costs (IDRC) do not primarily serve a development objective and are driven by domestic refugee inflows rather than development priorities.**

→ **Imputed student costs have a development rationale that is often difficult to demonstrate with a consequently limited development impact.**

→ **Private sector instruments (PSIs) are non-concessional, meaning not provided on favourable terms. This makes them misaligned with ODA's core purpose of providing public finance at better terms than the market.**

→ **Debt relief can involve double-counting, increasing ODA budgets without generating new financial resources for Majority World countries.**

→ **ODA loans calculations rely on rates that overstate the real donor effort involved. As a result, reported ODA can exceed the real amount of finance transferred to Majority World countries.**

3.1 The scale of ODA inflation: as ODA shrinks, too little goes to tackling poverty and inequalities

EU Member States

In 2025, **more than one fifth of EU ODA did not meet the criteria to qualify as ODA as it lacked a clear development objective and/or did not reach Majority World countries.** Inflated ODA from MS amounted to EUR 16.5 billion, **representing 22% of their total ODA.** This share has slightly increased from 2024 (21%), even despite a decrease in IDRC and further cuts to bilateral programmes. **The share of inflated ODA from MS remains far above levels before the war in Ukraine in 2022,** when it typically fluctuated between 10% and 15%.

IDRC continues to dominate inflated ODA. **Imputed student costs** are expected to remain the second-largest inflated component (approximately 20% of the total).[16] **Private Sector Instruments (PSI) ODA and debt relief both grew dramatically.** PSI ODA increased from EUR 1.0 billion in 2024 to EUR 1.4 billion in 2025, and debt relief rose from EUR 147 million to EUR 278 million. **ODA loans'** inflated share is expected to remain unchanged, at around EUR 1.1 billion.[17]

Among EU MS, **Ireland once again had the highest inflation rate (30.4%) and was followed by Germany (29.0%), Latvia (26.2%), Poland (24.8%) and Austria (24.7%).**

16 Data for imputed student costs are not yet available in the April preliminary report, therefore data from 2024 were carried over.

17 Data for inflated ODA loans are not yet available in the April preliminary report, therefore data from 2023/24 were carried over.

Chart 3. Breakdown of inflated and non-inflated ODA from EU MS (2025, EUR million, constant)



Note: Values are rounded to the nearest EUR million.
The 2025 figure for inflated ODA loans is carried over from the 2023/2024 estimates.

Source: calculations based on uploaded master pivot constant dataset and dataset provided by OECD DCD Secretariat

Chart 4. Total inflated ODA and breakdown per EU MS (2025)



Sources: Authors based on AidWatch report 2025; OECD data explorer; DCD data set preliminary ODA 2026

EU Institutions

Unlike MS, **EU Institutions report very limited amounts of inflated ODA, a practice that should continue.** From 2018–2025, the share generally represented less than 0.3% of their total ODA. The challenge for EU Institutions is whether ODA is prioritised to countries that can most benefit from it such as LDCs and FCAs. Indeed, **only 10.5% of EU Institutions' gross bilateral ODA reached LDCs in 2024**. The largest share went to lower middle-income countries, raising c**oncerns about the balance between strategic priorities and the poverty and inequalities-focused objectives set in EU Treaties**.[18] This concern is amplified by the growing emphasis on financial instruments under the EU's Global Gateway strategy, which increasingly links development finance to economic and geostrategic interests.

3.2 Private Sector Instruments: a rising component of EU ODA

PSI ODA reported by EU MS increased **from EUR 996 million in 2023 to EUR 1.4 billion in 2025. Despite still accounting for a relatively small share of total MS ODA,[19] this share rose steadily from 1.3% in 2023 to 1.5% in 2024 and 2.2% in 2025.** While cuts to ODA grants continue, the growing use of PSI reflects the increasing policy emphasis on mobilising private finance for sustainable development, reinforcing the need to **ensure that instruments such as guarantees and loans complement, rather than replace, grant-based ODA.** This is especially relevant for LDCs and FCAs, where grants are more appropriate for poverty reduction and more aligned with human development objectives than loans.[20]

Finland, Germany, France, Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark reported the largest PSIs volumes in 2025. Germany ranked first after more than doubling its PSIs, while France increased its reported volumes by around 32% and Finland nearly doubled its amounts. Austria and Sweden continued to report relatively large PSI volumes.

As a share of total ODA, the highest shares were reported by Finland (6.0%), the UK (4.4%), Austria (4.0%), Sweden (3.1%) and Denmark (2.6%).

Chart 5. PSI share for some EU MS and the UK (2023 - 2025)



Source: authors, all data from OECD DAC Explorer / CRS. PSI data are available from 2018 onwards, but comparability is limited due to changes in DAC rules introduced for 2023 ODA reporting

18 See OECD DAC (2026), Development Co-operation Profile: European Union Institutions; OECD DAC (2024), ODA final figures.

19 In addition, disbursement-based data used for measurement against the 0.7% target will likely show a potential increase of PSI shares in DAC members' ODA with a certain delay.

20 See CONCORD (2026), Rounding out the EU's Global Gateway: 360 degrees for human development, policy brief, June 2026.

3.3 In-donor refugee costs: a smaller decline than the scale of EU ODA cuts

IDRC remained the largest source of inflated ODA among EU MS in 2025, despite falling by 22.6% to EUR 10.3 billion. Even after this decline, IDRC remained above levels reported before the start of the war in Ukraine in 2022. In 2025, almost **one in seven euro reported as ODA by MS was still spent on refugee-related costs within MS rather than reaching Majority World countries.**[21]

Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Luxembourg,[22] **Romania and Slovakia reported zero, low or near-zero** IDRC. While high volumes of IDRC are often encountered in countries with large numbers of asylum applications, such as in Germany, France, Spain, Italy and Greece, the correlation was not uniform in 2025. **EU MS with similar numbers of asylum applications often report different levels of IDRC, reflecting how national accounting practices and budgetary arrangements influence ODA figures.**

Chart 6. In-donor refugee costs as a percentage of ODA for EU MS (2013[21], 2018 - 2025)



Sources: Authors based on AidWatch report 2025; OECD data explorer; DCD data set preliminary ODA 2026

21 2013 has been included as a reference year to show longer term trends on the reporting of IDRC.

22 See Luxembourg, and the chapter on good practice below.

3.4 Imputed student costs : ODA shaped by domestic education expenditure

Imputed student costs **accounted for 3.9% of total MS ODA in 2025.** In 2025, **Germany reported EUR 2.19 billion (65% of MS total), followed by France with EUR 826 million (24%), Austria EUR 223 million (7%) and Poland EUR 139 million (4%).** Imputed student costs are counted as ODA even though the expenditure is made in the EU instead of in Majority World countries. For example, Germany reports the imputed costs of students coming from China to study at German universities as ODA, **even though Germany does not have a bilateral development cooperation programme with China**.

3.5 Debt relief : a temporary boost to ODA with limited resources behind

Debt relief remained a relatively small but highly volatile component of EU MS' reported ODA between 2018 and 2025, accounting for 0.37% of total ODA in 2025. France accounted for almost 70% of all EU debt relief reported in 2025. The increase to EUR 318 million in 2025 is significant not because of its size, but because it illustrates how debt relief can increase reported ODA without representing an equivalent increase in new development finance for Majority World countries.

Chart 7. Imputed student costs for EU MS (2018-2025, EUR million current)



Source: authors, DAC Secretariat file 4 September 2025 with CRS and DAC1 data sets and from OECD DAC Explorer / CRS, DAC Press Release DCD (2025)6.

Chart 8. Debt relief by EU MS (2018-2025, EUR million, current)



Source: authors, DAC Secretariat file 4 September 2025 with CRS and DAC1 data sets and from OECD DAC Explorer / CRS, DAC Press Release

3.6 Inflated ODA loans

Inflated ODA reported from loans remained a relatively limited but still relevant component. After rising sharply in 2020, the share remained elevated in 2021 and 2022 before declining significantly from 2023 onwards. Since then, ODA loans have stabilised at over EUR 1 billion annually, **representing less than 1% of total MS ODA in 2025**. While the amounts are not as high when compared to other forms of inflated ODA, the methodology used to report loans can still overstate MS effort, making reported ODA appear higher than the actual level of resources provided to Majority World countries.

Chart 9. Inflated ODA reported from loans by EU MS (2018-2025, EUR million, current)



Source: authors, DAC Secretariat file 4 September 2025 with CRS and DAC1 data sets and from OECD DAC Explorer / CRS, DAC Press Release DCD(2025)

4. Good practice in EU ODA

Several MS have examples of good practice for ODA budgeting which others can learn from. The first and most important is to meet the 0.7% target while ensuring that resources reach Majority World countries. Others include introducing policy measures to maintain high levels of untied aid and country programmable aid (CPA) or prioritising support for LDCs and FCAs. Long-standing commitments to rights-based approaches, such as gender equality and disability inclusion, are also fundamental.

4.1. Luxembourg

Poverty focus and no ODA inflation

Luxembourg continues to allocate around 1% of GNI to ODA, well above the 0.7% target.[23] Two factors enable this: **the country's long-standing political decision not to count IDRC as ODA,** and ensuring that climate finance remains additional to the core development budget. By providing ODA almost entirely in the form of grants, maintaining 100% untied aid, and strongly prioritising LDCs and FCAs, **Luxembourg safeguards the original meaning of ODA: giving something of value on favourable terms.**

Luxembourg has been able to maintain a concessional, externally-oriented poverty reduction approach, rather than focusing on domestic or geopolitical priorities by committing to the additionality principle. This is underpinned by Luxembourg's commitment to policy coherence for sustainable development (PCSD), sustainability checks for legislation and maintaining development objectives. While the OECD peer review praises Luxembourg's strong development focus and protection of ODA integrity, it also highlights the need **to ensure that increasing use of blended finance, innovative finance and private sector engagement remain aligned with sustainable development objectives** and do not gradually dilute core development priorities.

23 See OECD (2025), Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: Luxembourg 2025.

4.2. Sweden
A cap on in-donor refugee costs

Sweden has traditionally exceeded the 0.7% ODA/GNI target[24] and ranked third in 2025, behind Norway and Luxembourg.[25] Despite remaining one of the world's largest ODA providers, **recent reductions in overall ODA volumes and in ODA to LDCs in 2025 mark a shift.** Indeed, support to LDCs plummeted by 22% between 2024 and 2025.[26]

One example of Sweden's good practice was its decision to cap IDRC at a maximum of 8% of the total ODA budget, a measure the OECD mid-term peer review described as widely supported and potentially a model for other countries. However, Sweden still counts IDRC as ODA, and CSOs have criticised the rising per-person costs within the capped amount.[27] The 2019 OECD Peer Review[28] and related OECD assessments[29] described Swedish ODA as strongly focused on poverty reduction, human rights, democracy, gender equality, humanitarian principles and sustainable development. However, **the 2023 mid-term review signals growing tensions** and encourages Sweden to ensure poverty-focused ODA, guided by coherent development objectives. **Overall, Sweden illustrates both sides of the coin: it combines relatively high ODA volumes, grants and strong normative priorities, with an increasing shift toward interest-based development cooperation** and reduced support to the most marginalised countries.

24 See also CONCORD (2025), AidWatch 2025 Report, p. 20.

25 See OECD DAC (2026), Preliminary ODA figures, pp. 5, 9.

26 According to CONCORD Sweden's communication with its Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

27 A similar decision has been taken in the Netherlands. After deciding to abandon the long-standing 0.7% ODA/GNI commitment, the Netherlands nevertheless introduced in 2024 an important safeguard for ODA integrity by capping IDRC at 10% of the aid budget from 2027 onwards. This is particularly significant because such costs had exceeded this level for several years (reaching around 17% in 2026, 14% in 2025, 18% in 2024 and 17% in 2023), meaning that the cap helps stabilise the development budget and protect resources for international cooperation. On the downside, however, the Dutch government also decided that non-military support to Ukraine would henceforth be financed directly from the ODA budget rather than from a separate budget. See CONCORD's NL member, https://www.partos.nl/.

28 See OECD (2019), Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: Sweden.

29 See OECD (2025), Development Cooperation Profiles: Sweden; OECD (2024), Mid-Term Review Sweden.

4.3. Belgium
A principled approach ...under threat

Belgium is particularly relevant in the debate **because of the structure and orientation of its development cooperation model.** Belgian ODA has traditionally placed strong emphasis on multilateralism, untied aid, humanitarian assistance, social sectors and support to LDCs and FCAS. At the same time, it focused on grants, relying less on large sovereign lending portfolios, PSIs and highly leveraged financial mechanisms than other countries. The OECD peer review highlights Belgium's long-standing support for policy coherence, civil society engagement, gender equality and poverty reduction, as well as its strong use of untied aid and multilateral channels.

Yet this principled approach is under threat. Following the 2024 elections, a 25% cut to the development cooperation budget was announced for 2025–2027, demonstrating how rapidly development-oriented ODA models can come under pressure from domestic budget constraints and shifting political priorities. Moreover, in the new government's policy documents ODA is being reframed as a foreign policy instrument that must defend Belgium's interests. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Development cooperation is undergoing a restructuring that could weaken the ODA principles it used to defend. Belgium therefore demonstrates **a relatively strong tradition of ODA quality, which is however, also faced with the broader challenges for EU development cooperation,** where fiscal pressures, geopolitical priorities and migration-related concerns increasingly compete with long-term development objectives.

5. Policy recommendations

ODA plays a unique role: public finance allocated on favourable terms to promote the economic welfare and development of Majority World countries.[30]

Further cuts in **ODA budgets** will reverse decades of progress in health and other essential areas of human development.[31] Similarly, **diverting ODA resources to advance the EU's strategic interests and serve other policy objectives** such as export promotion or migration policy will undermine the trust in the EU's offer for international partnerships. Precisely because ODA is limited, expected to suffer further cuts and increasingly stretched to address an ever-growing list of global challenges,[32] **we call on EU Institutions and MS to:**

1. Uphold the core development mandate and concessionality of ODA.

➜ **Prioritise EU ODA grants and other forms of highly concessional finance for Least Developed Countries and Fragile and Conflict Affected contexts,** where ODA has the greatest potential to reduce inequalities and poverty and where private finance mobilisation is limited.

➜ **Maintain ODA as a distinct flow,** ensuring that private and blended finance complement, rather than replace ODA.

➜ **Lead efforts within the OECD DAC to strengthen the integrity of ODA** by ensuring it is not used to subsidise private investors or Export Credit Agencies (ECAs), and by capping the share channelled through private sector instruments and blending operations.

2. Measure and report poverty- and inequality-focused ODA and adopt binding targets to track progress.

➜ **Report ODA against existing indicators, including ODA to countries with lower Human Development Index (HDI)** scores.

➜ **Adopt and use project level tools** to measure ODA's contribution to reducing poverty and inequalities (EU Inequality Marker, Distributional Impact Assessments, OECD gender equality and disability markers...)

3. Set clear step-by-step plans to reverse the current cuts and to reach funding commitments of at least 0.7% of GNI to ODA and 0.15%–0.2% of GNI to LDCs by 2030.

➜ Increase ODA budgets through **real, programmable financial resources.**

➜ **Explore new sources to mobilise public development finance.**

30 Or partner countries as per OECD DAC official language.

31 See ISGlobal, Global aid cuts could reverse decades of progress in health and development.

32 These include poverty reduction, climate change, migration, pandemics, security and geopolitical stability.

4. Introduce a cap or ceiling on costs inflating EU ODA budgets as a first step towards their gradual exclusion, while ensuring transparent reporting.

→ Where full exclusion is not possible, **draw on the experience of some MS to introduce ceilings** (e.g: In-donor refugee costs cap in Sweden).

→ Present real ODA figures by **reporting all inflated ODA categories separately.**

5. Ground EU ODA in Majority World priorities and strengthen democratic ODA governance.

→ **Support the democratisation of ODA governance, shifting it away from the OECD DAC towards the United Nations.**

→ **Increase country programmable aid (CPA)**[33] so that a greater share of ODA is predictable and aligned with Majority World countries priorities, while ensuring that humanitarian assistance continues to receive adequate funding.

→ **Ensure that EU development cooperation initiatives are well coordinated, support local systems, and strengthen partner-country ownership throughout the Team.**

→ **Strengthen support for locally led development (LLD) and triangular cooperation as approaches that reinforce Majority World countries ownership.** Take inspiration from countries that already implement LLD frameworks.[34]



33 Country Programmable Aid (CPA) is ODA subject to multi-year planning at the country or regional level and over which partner countries could have significant say. See OECD DAC definition.

34 See OECD (2026), Practical Guidelines for Supporting Locally Led Development, p. 29.

Country pages

Austria

Reported ODA: EUR 1516 million
0.33% GNI (↓ from 0.35% in 2024)

Non-inflated ODA: EUR 1126 million
0.25% GNI (↓ –15,8% difference with 2024)

Total inflated ODA: EUR 390 million
24.7% of total

Platform: **AG Globale Verantwortung - Global Responsibility**

Cutting back on development cooperation will backfire like a boomerang.

Main trends

2025 was the **third consecutive year in which Austria recorded a decline in its ODA** ratio. Austria's ODA fell to 0.33% in 2025, from 0.34% in 2024, which is still far below the longstanding 0.7% international target and the 0.2% commitment to Least Developed Countries (LDCs). The reduction in ODA in 2025 is largely due to **cuts in multilateral development cooperation and humanitarian assistance.**

The new Austrian federal government, which has been in office since March 2025, has also begun scaling back its international engagement under the combined 2025–26 budget, thereby weakening the country's foreign-policy instruments. The government has made **disproportionately large cuts to the budgets of the Austrian Development Agency (ADA) and the Foreign Disaster Relief Fund (AKF) in 2025 and 2026, directly affecting Civil Society Organisation (CSO) funding.** ADA budgets, which represent funding for CSOs, declined by EUR 8.5 million from 2024 to 2025 and again by EUR 27 million from 2025 to 2026. Spending for the AKF dropped from 2024 to 2025 by EUR 10 million to EUR 58 million. An annual allocation of only EUR 35 million to the AKF has been announced. **This substantial decline of funding for bilateral development cooperation and humanitarian assistance represents a strategic mistake that could come back to hit Austria like a boomerang.**

Government's relationship with civil society

The Austrian government funds some CSO projects in Austria and in Majority World countries directly through the ADA. **Historically, funding to CSOs represents between one fourth and one third of ADA bilateral funding.** However, since the ADA budget only represented around 8.5% of overall development cooperation in 2025, the actual number of CSOs-funded projects remained quite low. At the same time, **additional funding opportunities from other ministries, such as the Climate and Social Ministry, ceased to support CSO projects** through dedicated calls for proposals.

Following the budget cuts announced for 2025 and 2026, **the government suspended ADA-funded calls for CSOs in development cooperation, as well as calls for global citizenship education in 2026.** While recent announcements about the 2027/2028 budgets indicate that no further reductions to development cooperation are planned, funding levels are expected to remain at the already reduced level established in 2026. These cuts to the ADA and AKF budgets risk further diminishing Austria's support for civil society and narrowing the operating space for NGOs, particularly smaller CSOs. As a result, they may weaken the consistent support that Austria has historically provided through its legal and funding frameworks.

Recommendations

Recommendations to the Austrian government remain similar to those made in recent years:

→ **Reverse recent cuts to ADA, AKF and other humanitarian assistance funding** as well as multilateral budgets and **focus on qualitative improvements of ODA by directing more funding towards Least Developed Countries (LDCs), untying aid, and prioritising resources to reduce structural inequalities,** hunger, poverty, and gender inequalities in the Majority World. Only qualitative changes in conjunction with better ODA coordination and policy coherence can deliver meaningful impact in times of ODA cuts.

→ **Ensure long-term, needs-based funding aligned with human rights and international solidarity commitments, and institutionalise the humanitarian–development-peace nexus** through adopting an implementation plan for Austria's Humanitarian Aid Strategy, with clear indicators, dedicated budget headings, early action triggers, and inclusive governance.

→ **Address pressing and inherent needs of partners in Majority World countries and assist in development financing,** e.g. through debt relief initiatives, supporting the UN Tax Convention and follow-up activities of the Sevilla Funding for Development Conference.

→ **Counteract the shrinking of civil society space to ensure that development cooperation remains effective and inclusive** even in times of fiscal constraints by increasing support for CSOs, both in Austria and through partnerships with local organisations in Majority World countries to enhance local ownership and resilience. In practice, this means expanding direct support to women's organisations, supporting their leadership in empowerment and efforts to combat gender-based violence, while promoting sexual and reproductive health and rights.

Belgium

Reported ODA: EUR 2256 million
0.37% GNI (↓ from 0.48% in 2024)

Non-inflated ODA: EUR 1995 million
0.33% GNI (↓ –19.7% difference with 2024)

Total inflated ODA: EUR 261 million
11.1% of total

National Platform:
CNCD-11.11.11 and 11.11.11

Belgium's ODA paradox: Doing less while asking for more in return.

National report on ODA
CNCD-11.11.11, Rapport 2026 sur la Coopération belge au développement, Septembre 2026.[35]

Main trends

In 2025, Belgian ODA fell by 21.4% in a single year – its lowest share of Gross National Income (GNI) since 2001, dropping from 0.48% to 0.37%. Belgium now ranks well below the international target of 0.7% of GNI and below the EU average (0.42%). This decline stems from a combination of cyclical factors and **the first wave of 25% budget cuts** imposed by the federal government, which mostly targeted the multilateral channel, reducing contributions to organisations such as UNICEF, UNDP and the Global Fund. The **government's cuts will continue in 2026 and 2027, alongside the discontinuation of governmental cooperation programmes with Mali, Guinea and Mozambique.**

Despite these cuts, **Belgian cooperation has always been praised for its quality:** a strong focus on least developed countries and fragile contexts, **a near-total share of grants (96.8%) over loans, largely untied aid, and leading performance on gender equality mainstreaming.** However, development cooperation is increasingly framed around mutually beneficial partnerships. This carries the risk of fostering a more transactional approach, in which Belgium's economic and security interests play a more prominent role in shaping cooperation priorities.

While it is positive that the **Minister for Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation has prioritised the funding of global public goods** (with a focus on climate, health and stability), **an approach based on mutually beneficial partnerships should not undermine the aid-effectiveness principles of alignment and local ownership,** and cannot divert resources away from the most fragile countries toward lower-risk partners offering greater economic returns for Belgian companies.

35 The link is not yet available online.

Government's relationship with civil society

The **role of civil society is explicitly acknowledged in the new government's coalition agreement** and is seen as complementary to other development channels. The Minister for Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation has also emphasised the importance of an open civic space. At the same time, **significant budget cuts are foreseen for CSOs (25%) in their next pluri-annual programmes (2027-2031), alongside a push for geographical and thematic concentration.** The minister rejected all sector-proposals from the Civil Society Organisation (CSO) federations on how to implement these NGO cuts. **The autonomy and right of initiative of CSOs have been put under pressure by the minister's political priorities** and transposed in programme assessment and financing.

As civil society actors, we expect the minister to **continue defending development cooperation as a policy tool aimed at reducing poverty and inequality.** We also hope he will publicly reaffirm the crucial role of civil society–not only as an implementing partner, but as a vital pillar of a healthy democracy all over the world. Within the current coalition, there are divergent views on this matter. This makes it all the more important that the minister provides clear leadership on these fundamental principles.

Recommendations

→ **Reverse the trend of budget cuts** and instead move toward honouring Belgium's **longstanding commitment of allocating 0.7% of its GNI to ODA.**

→ Keep the **eradication of poverty and inequality as the primary objective of ODA.**

→ **Promote equal and transparent partnerships** based on alignment and democratic ownership, that truly respond to the needs and priorities of communities in marginalised situations.

→ **Support independent and critical civil society** as a cornerstone of democracy – especially now, as democratic values face increasing threats worldwide.

Croatia

Reported ODA: EUR 208.3 million
0.24% GNI (↓ 6.9% difference with 2024)

Non-inflated ODA: EUR 185 million
0.24% GNI (↑ 2.80% difference with 2024)

Total inflated ODA: EUR 0.04 million
0.02% of total

National Platform: **Croatian Platform for International Citizen Solidarity - CROSOL**

Croatian development sector stagnates while civil society is frozen out.

National report on ODA
Report on the Implementation of International Development Cooperation by the Republic of Croatia for 2024[36]

Main trends

According to OECD preliminary data, total ODA in Croatia was €223.7 million in 2024 and €208.3 million in 2025. **ODA volume decreased by 6.9%.** Croatia has yet to meet the commitment of reaching an ODA/Gross National Income (GNI) ratio of 0.33% by 2030, as well as the 0.7% ODA/GNI target. **As Croatia provides only grants,** total ODA calculated on a grant-equivalent basis corresponds to net ODA under the cash-flow methodology previously applied. Croatia also continues to allocate a significant share of its ODA to support its diaspora.

Croatia still needs to devise a strategic policy framework with clearly defined ODA priorities. The government has continually shown a lack of transparency and timeliness in publishing the ODA data, a trend which continues in 2026.

Although Croatia adopted the Act on International Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid in 2024, the national development cooperation strategy has not yet been developed, continuing the policy vacuum left with the expiration of the previous strategy in 2021. There is currently no information on the planned date of adoption for the new strategy, and civil society actors are excluded from the process.

Government's relationship with civil society

The Act on International Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid adopted in February 2024 aims to enable more dynamic cooperation with development stakeholders who were not included in the implementation of the previous Act, in particular CSOs and the private sector. It also **specifically lists CSOs as both actors who undertake development**

36 https://edoc.sabor.hr/DocumentView.aspx?entid=2040169

cooperation and through whom development projects can be financed.

In reality, cooperation with CSOs has been declining. Previously, CROSOL has been included as a representative of civil society in the multistakeholder committee for international development cooperation and humanitarian aid, but has been left out of the new composition of the committee which was established in late 2025. **There are currently no CSO representatives in official policy-making bodies, and inputs from civil society are excluded when official documents are drafted.** There is a lack of transparency and progress regarding the creation of a new national strategy for development cooperation and humanitarian aid.

Recommendations

→ **Step up efforts to create a clear policy direction and priorities in ODA allocations** by drafting and adopting the new national strategy for development cooperation. This is urgent as 5 years have now passed since the expiry of the previous strategy.

→ **Reverse the trend of excluding CSOs from policy-making processes** and include a civil society representative in its multistakeholder committee for international development cooperation and humanitarian aid.

→ **Remove the exclusive focus on ethnic Croats and Christians from its international development programming** and disburse ODA in Majority World countries without discriminating against non-Croats or non-Christians.

→ **Exclude in-donor refugee costs and funds for security or migration from its ODA figures.**

Cyprus

Reported ODA: N/A

Non-inflated ODA: N/A

Total inflated ODA: N

National Platform: **CARDET, CONCORD Associate Member**

A small provider stepping up.

Main trends

Following the institutionalisation of CyprusAid in 2024, **Cyprus is entering a new phase in its development cooperation and humanitarian assistance.** CyprusAid provides a dedicated mechanism within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to coordinate development cooperation and humanitarian assistance. In 2025, its role appears to be consolidating, becoming more visible as a tool for international cooperation, regional engagement and contribution to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). **Cyprus is a positive exception to the wider European trend of declining ODA.** In 2025, ODA allocations almost doubled, suggesting stronger political attention to Cyprus' role in the EU's development cooperation system and the humanitarian sector.

Cyprus' ODA includes the following contributions: humanitarian assistance, bilateral and multilateral contributions, voluntary and mandatory contributions, support to EU and UN mechanisms, assistance provided to asylum seekers during their first 12 months in Cyprus, and scholarships for students from Majority World countries. However, reported ODA also includes in-donor refugee costs, which are considered inflated ODA.

The humanitarian and regional dimension remains central. Cyprus uses its geographic position in the Eastern Mediterranean to support humanitarian responses, including through the Amalthea Plan and assistance to conflict-affected areas. At the same time, its development portfolio is expanding through education, training and capacity-building. Gender mainstreaming, SDG alignment and reporting through frameworks such as Total Official Support for Sustainable Development (TOSSD) are also gaining importance.

With Cyprus holding the 2026 Presidency of the Council of the EU, there is an opportunity to further define its added value as a small EU Member State and regional actor. This momentum should be supported by a clearer public strategy, transparent reporting and structured engagement with civil society.

Government's relationship with civil society

The relationship between the Cypriot Government and civil society in development cooperation remains positive but under-structured. **Cyprus' ODA policy has traditionally been centralised within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, although the formalisation of CyprusAid creates an opportunity for more institutionalised civil society engagement.**

At the same time, CSOs in Cyprus have made significant efforts to comply with evolving legal, administrative and reporting requirements, often with limited resources. While transparency and accountability are important, these obligations should not unintentionally restrict civic participation or narrow the space for CSOs to contribute to policy dialogue and international cooperation.

Cooperation exists, **mainly through specific organisations and international networks, such as the Red Cross and Volunteer Doctors Cyprus.** CyprusAid also showed openness to explore cooperation with other CSOs. However, there is still no formal consultation mechanism or structured partnership framework allowing Cypriot CSOs to contribute systematically to ODA priorities, implementation, monitoring or public awareness.

Recommendations

→ **Develop and publish a clear Cyprus development cooperation strategy,** setting out CyprusAid's geographic and thematic priorities, expected results and alignment with the SDGs, EU development policy and humanitarian principles.

→ **Improve public transparency and reporting of Cyprus ODA,** including clear information on bilateral and multilateral contributions, humanitarian assistance, scholarships, La Francophonie actions, asylum-related costs, in-kind support and voluntary contributions.

→ **Establish a structured consultation mechanism with civil society, enabling Cypriot CSOs and knowledge-based organisations to contribute to ODA planning,** implementation, public awareness and monitoring.

→ **Create concrete partnership opportunities for civil society, including pilot actions or cooperation schemes in areas where Cyprus has added value,** such as development education, capacity building, sustainable tourism, health, gender equality, humanitarian response and regional cooperation.

Czechia

Reported ODA: EUR 353 million
0.12% GNI (↓ from 0.16% in 2024)

Non-inflated ODA: EUR 350 million
0.12% GNI (↓ –6.2% difference with 2024)

Total inflated ODA: EUR 3 million
0.8% of total

National Platform: **FoRS**

Czechia recorded one of the lowest levels of ODA spending among OECD DAC members in 2025, with further concerns emerging over the increasing instrumentalisation of development cooperation budgets.

Main trends

In 2025, **the trend of downplaying the relevance of ODA and failing to establish more robust implementation structures continued, alongside problematic cuts to bilateral ODA for 2026.** A positive element, however, was the continued support for humanitarian and stabilisation assistance to Ukraine.

Following the appointment of the new government in late 2025, severe budget cuts were applied for 2026, affecting both humanitarian aid and bilateral development cooperation. The dedicated funding budget for assistance to Ukraine was discontinued, while **a new private sector co-financing instrument, based on loans and guarantees, was established to complement the European Commission (EC) Ukraine Facility.**

Projections for the coming years are similarly unfavourable and impose significant constraints not only on humanitarian spending, but also on the country's ability to engage in broader initiatives such as the Global Gateway, which has effectively become the primary focus of Czech bilateral ODA going forward.

The overarching policy shift is well illustrated by a statement from the Minister of Foreign Affairs in June 2026:

"The old model was based on a moral obligation. The new one rests on strategic interest, economic logic, and partnership. We view development as an investment, not as charity–as an opportunity for trade, infrastructure, exports, know-how, and state-to-state and business cooperation. It is no coincidence that the United States is now openly championing the 'trade over aid' principle–a stance we were among the very few European nations to adopt."

Government's relationship with civil society

Relations between government stakeholders and CSOs remained generally cooperative in 2025. However, in the area of humanitarian and development cooperation, political commitment was insufficient to prevent budget cuts imposed by the Ministry of Finance. At the working level, cooperation has largely continued into 2026.

At the highest policy level, however, the situation has changed significantly. The role and legitimacy of CSOs have increasingly been questioned by some government members, with repeated criticism emerging in the media and on social networks. Combined with cuts to humanitarian and development funding, this has substantially weakened the capacity of many organisations to fulfil their mission and provide ODA where it is most needed.

Recommendations

→ **Stop ODA budget cuts, particularly bilateral cuts,** and focus on predictability while also providing space for flexibility for implementers to react to the rapidly changing contexts.

→ **Reflect on increasing needs in the humanitarian field** and ensure that all country strategies and development projects explicitly address poverty and/or inequality

→ **Continue to involve a wide variety of contributors, including CSOs,** in development policy debates and implementation.

→ **Focus on effectiveness, good governance;** human rights, including gender equality; and protection of the environment and climate.

Denmark

Reported ODA: EUR 2885 million
0.72% GNI (0.72% in 2024)

Non-inflated ODA: EUR 2616 million
0.66% GNI (↑ 0.60% difference with 2024)

Total inflated ODA: EUR 269 million
8.9% of total

National Platform:
Globalt Fokus - Global Focus

0.7% Stands Firm, but Focus Risks Dilution.

Main trends

Denmark maintains its ongoing commitment to 0.7% ODA and as the Danish economy remains strong, ODA reached a total of DKK 22.9 billion in 2025 – **a new record for the total amount of ODA.**

Poverty eradication remains the main objective of Danish development cooperation but is increasingly balanced with other priorities. 2025 continued the trend towards integration of development cooperation with foreign affairs, security and trade policy. The new development cooperation strategy **"A changing world – partnerships in development"**, launched in July 2025, places development cooperation as part of a broader geostrategic engagement and points to national interests.

In 2025, the "Private Sector, Investment and Trade" is one of four stated priorities for Danish ODA, emphasising an **increased focus on economic diplomacy, blended finance and public/private cooperation as well as gearing of resources.** Other priorities remain Ukraine and Africa, as well as climate diplomacy and green development cooperation. 'Irregular' migration was a cross-cutting priority in 2025 and remains central to public conversations on ODA as well as in the new strategy. **With the new strategy, the EU is increasingly stressed as an important arena for development cooperation including through the Global Gateway.**

Looking forward, we expect a **continued move towards geostrategic framing of development** cooperation as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lars Løkke Rasmussen, enters his second term of office as Minister of Foreign Affairs with responsibility for development cooperation; Løkke is expected to promote further integration between policy areas. The minister is a strong champion of the 0.7% commitment that is also mentioned in the current government's coalition agreement, indicating continued delivery on the commitment.

Government's relationship with civil society

Denmark has a **strong tradition of collaboration** between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and civil society which is still the case. The new development cooperation strategy acknowledges an independent civil society as an important strategic partner and democratic stakeholder in Denmark's development cooperation. **In 2025 a new structure of engagement with external actors was set up,** changing the formal ways civil society engages with the Ministry's programmes. How this affects the engagement of civil society in practice is still to be seen, just as ways of influencing the new structure are being explored.

During the development of the new development cooperation strategy there was consultation with civil society both in written format as well as through round table discussions. However, consultation was mainly aimed at organised civil society with limited opportunities for engagement for the general public or less well-organised civil society actors as well as media. This could be explored further in future consultations also considering increased attention to public support for development cooperation.

Recommendations

→ Continue to fulfill the commitment to deliver 0,7% of GNI in ODA, anchored in poverty eradication, human rights, sustainable development, equal partnerships and a rules-based world order and further allocate 0,15-0,2% of aid to LDCs in line with the global commitment.

→ Strengthen global democratic resilience through financial and political support for civic space and human right defenders.

→ Contribute to reform of global financial institutions advancing equal representation and civil society inclusion as well as strong international frameworks for responsible loans and debt management as well as taxation.

→ Ensure that aid is given according to the assessment of needs in partner countries and that local partners, including civil society, are involved in project ownership, design and implementation.

Estonia

Reported ODA: EUR 73 million
0.19% GNI (↓ from 0.2% in 2024)

Non-inflated ODA: EUR 71 million
0.19% GNI (↓ –2.7% difference with 2024)

Total inflated ODA: EUR 2 million
2.4% of total

National Platform:
Estonian Roundtable for Development Cooperation (AKÜ)

Institutional capacity progressed, but funding accessibility and predictability for CSOs remain challenging.

Main trends

2025 was marked by record-breaking cuts to ODA around the world, with significant repercussions for Estonia as well. As a result of the dissolution of USAID, Estonian CSOs alone faced preliminary estimated losses of at least USD 30 million at the beginning of the year. This meant the **cancellation of planned programme activities, placing both in-country and field staff on paid and unpaid leave and a great deal of administrative and financial confusion,** the costs of which organisations largely had to cover themselves.

Despite the external volatility, a key institutional development this year was **the Estonian Centre for International Development (ESTDEV) receiving a high rating in the European Commission's Pillar Assessment,** enabling it to independently manage EU development funds in the future. Until now, ESTDEV's activities had been largely funded from the State budget, with projects also involving partners from other countries. The positive Pillar Assessment recognises the reliability and impact of Estonia's development cooperation and also opens up many new possibilities for ESTDEV and Estonian CSOs to participate in larger EU-funded initiatives and partnerships.

Estonia also revised its development cooperation priorities, **shifting from a country-based to a regional approach in line with evolving EU policy.** While the EU's Eastern Neighbourhood remains the primary geographic focus, particularly Ukraine, engagement continues across the wider region, including Moldova and Armenia. Bilateral cooperation with Georgia remains suspended due to political instability. In Africa, Estonia will continue working in eastern and southern regions, using national funding to leverage larger EU and other provider funding. Estonia also aims to expand its activities in Central Asia and the Western Balkans through externally funded projects. Looking ahead, **Estonia's ODA hopefully will remain stable in national budget terms** but will expand through increased access to EU and multilateral funding.

Government's relationship with civil society

In 2025, **the relationship between Estonian CSOs and governmental stakeholders remained relatively positive.** CSOs continue to have good relations with representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and are considered as good experts and partners in cooperation planning and implementation. In addition, AKÜ continues to be represented on ESTDEV's advisory board, ensuring that civil society's voice is heard.

At the same time, **the relationship remains stronger in dialogue than in practical influence.** CSOs provide feedback on funding instruments and programme design, but this is not always reflected in final decisions. **Access to funding remains difficult, especially for smaller organisations, and the logic of framework procurements can be restrictive.** In 2025, ESTDEV's upcoming calls were announced in the autumn, but the calls were delayed several times and opened only in December. Organisations then had to wait months for results, while project activities were expected to start, creating staffing and cash-flow challenges which negatively affected the impact and quality of the work. **The positive Pillar Assessment is promising, but it remains unclear how Estonian CSOs will access new EU funding opportunities.**

Recommendations

→ **Ensure that ESTDEV's expanded role as an EU implementing partner is accompanied by transparent and meaningful engagement with civil society.** As ESTDEV gains access to larger EU funding streams, Estonian CSOs should continue to have fair opportunities to participate as strategic implementation partners through clear and predictable funding mechanisms. Current funding and partnership models should better reflect the specific added value of CSOs, particularly in reaching vulnerable groups, working with local communities and ensuring needs-based development impact.

→ **ESTDEV should provide a clear and realistic annual funding calendar to ensure that calls open and decisions are made before project activities are expected to start,** and avoid placing the financial risk of delays on CSOs. In addition, funding instruments should be designed in a way that remains accessible to smaller and medium-sized CSOs, including through proportionate eligibility criteria, reasonable co-financing requirements, smaller grant windows and flexible partnership models.

→ **Consultation with CSOs should take place early enough to influence the design of funding instruments and policy priorities.** Feedback mechanisms should also be more transparent, so that organisations understand why some input was taken into account and some was not.

→ **Estonia should ensure that development cooperation remains guided by Majority World countries' needs,** civil society expertise, human rights and long-term development impact, rather than being framed primarily through the lens of business diplomacy or economic interests.

Finland

Reported ODA: EUR 1181 million
0.44% GNI (↓ from 0.47% in 2024)

Non-inflated ODA: EUR 893 million
0.34% GNI (↓ –12.9% difference with 2024)

Total inflated ODA: EUR 288 million
23.4% of total

National Platform: **Fingo**

Finland remains engaged globally, but with alarmingly reduced ODA.

National report on ODA
Report on International Economic Relations and Development Cooperation[37]
Openaid: Databank on Finland's development cooperation [38]

Main trends

By the end of 2025, decisions taken during Finland's current parliamentary term (2023–2027 **reduced 'funding equivalent to core development cooperation' by EUR 167 million, or 23%.** In monetary terms, **the largest reductions have been made to bilateral development cooperation (-EUR 118 million; -61%) and multilateral cooperation (-EUR 55 million; -25%).**[39]

Cuts have been made in every year of the parliamentary term. In 2026, the cuts are expected to remain small and to spare core development cooperation funding.

The outlook for the future is uncertain. In Finland, few political actors advocate increasing development cooperation appropriations. In addition to political value choices, a major factor is the **significant need to adjust the State budget.** Parliamentary elections will be held in 2027 and a possible change of government **could bring the current policy of cuts to a halt.**

Government's relationship with civil society

The relationship between the Finnish government and civil society is still mixed, as last year.

On the positive side:

→ The government has declared that **civil society is a focus for Finnish development policy and that Finnish NGOs are a key partner for the government.** This is seen in

37 https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/items/9df60fcb-b716-4320-9503-a86db7ff0bb2

38 https://openaid.fi/en/

39 Core development cooperation refers largely to funding that can be programmed and allocated by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. It does not include, for example, refugee reception costs. The calculation method has changed during the current parliamentary term. For this reason, it is clearer to refer to "funding equivalent to core development cooperation" rather than core development cooperation funding itself.

funding as almost every other dimension of the ODA has been cut, but support for most NGOs has not.

On the negative side:

→ The government **ended two kinds of grants:** the support for peace promotion, and support for global citizenship education. The reasons seem to be ideological because there could have been money for these grants.

→ Many in the NGO sector perceive the participation of civil society in policy processes as more limited than before. Fingo, as a part of the OECD DAC peer review process, found that the opportunities for participation have been reduced under the current government.

Recommendations

Finland should:

→ **Change direction for development funding:** by cutting ODA, Finland is not a reliable partner for Majority World countries and international institutions and does not play its part in international sustainable development.

→ **Craft a clear plan for reaching international commitments:** 0.7% of ODA/GNI, 0.2% of ODA/ Gross National Income (GNI) for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) countries and 85% of ODA to measures that support gender equality.

→ **Strengthen the support for the most marginalised people,** areas and countries, including financial contribution to LDCs.

→ **Continue to partner with diverse civil society actors,** maintain commitments to transparency and Civil Society Organisation (CSO) policy participation and adequately fund development communications and awareness work to maintain high public support for development cooperation.

France

Reported ODA: EUR 12209 million
0.42% GNI (↓ from 0.48% in 2024)

Non-inflated ODA: EUR 9858 million
0.34% GNI (↓ –5.3% difference with 2024)

Total inflated ODA: EUR 2351 million
18.5% of total

National Platform: **Coordination SUD**

From leadership to retrenchment: France's continued retreat from global solidarity.

National report on ODA
Coordination SUD, October 2025, Alerte rouge sur le budget de la solidarité internationale[40]

Main trends

Massive **budget cuts in 2025 have confirmed the shift in the French government's approach to global solidarity that began in 2024.** Since then, the French government has implemented successive cuts to its ODA budget, amounting to a cumulative reduction of EUR 3.2 billion between 2024 and 2026. In 2026 alone, **the ODA budget declined by 59% compared with 2025 levels.** Funding for CSOs and multilateral contributions have been particularly affected by these reductions. According to preliminary OECD data, **French ODA fell by 10.9% in 2025, marking the second consecutive year of decline.**

The impact on people in need and civil society has been significant. In 2025 alone, French CSOs were severely affected by the reduction in ODA funding, resulting in the loss of approximately 10 000 jobs worldwide, which is equivalent to 20% of total employment in the sector. At the political level, the President and the French government have **advocated for a redefinition of France's approach to international cooperation and development.**

While the contours of this new policy remain somewhat unclear, there are indications that France is gradually **moving away from a model centred on global public goods and human development toward one more explicitly aligned with national interests (economic and diplomatic).** This shift is reflected in the emphasis on "mutually beneficial partnerships" promoted during the Sevilla negotiations and in the priorities announced for France's 2026 G7 Presidency.

In this context, **French CSOs are increasingly concerned that France may prioritise state interests over the needs of marginalised communities, instrumentalise ODA, and reduce its support for CSOs worldwide.** Such trends could weaken community outreach,

40 https://www.coordinationsud.org/document-ressource/alerte-rouge-sur-le-budget-de-la-solidarite-internationale/

human rights protection, and the delivery of development and humanitarian assistance while deeply affecting France ODA credibility and efficiency.

Government's relationship with civil society

The dialogue between civil society and the government on development cooperation and humanitarian assistance is institutionalised through dedicated consultation mechanisms, including the National Council on Development and Global Solidarity (CNDSI) and the Humanitarian Concertation Group (GCH). **National CSO platforms, such as Coordination SUD, also meet regularly with ministers and officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Economy and Budget** to discuss political priorities and the allocation of ODA resources.

However, **civic space in France is shrinking,** with growing pressures on CSOs that advocate for human rights and global solidarity. Republican Commitment Contracts imposed on French CSOs can be exploited as tools to restrict or silence critical voices, and several organisations have faced public attacks from far-right politicians for their work.

Recommendations

→ **Restore France's commitment to global solidarity** by reaffirming a human rights-based and people-centred approach to development cooperation and humanitarian assistance, placing the needs and rights of marginalised communities at the heart of all policies and programmes, including for women, girls and children.

→ **Reverse ODA budget cuts and rebuild France's development ambitions** by restoring funding levels and mobilising new and predictable sources of financing, including the reinstatement of solidarity-based contributions such as taxes on financial transactions and airline tickets dedicated to development cooperation.

→ **Protect and strengthen civil society's role as a key development and humanitarian actor** by increasing direct and flexible funding for CSOs, ensuring an enabling environment for their work, and supporting their capacity to reach and empower communities worldwide; including through the perpetuation of the support fund for feminist organisations.

Germany

Reported ODA: EUR 24060 million
0.56% GNI (↓ from 0.68% in 2024)

Non-inflated ODA: EUR 16801 million
0.40% GNI (↓ –18.4% difference with 2024)

Total inflated ODA: EUR 7258 million
29% of total

National Platform: **VENRO**

Germany is cutting back international cooperation.

National report on ODA "ODA under Pressure"[41]

Main trends

New Government, new priorities

Germany's development cooperation landscape underwent significant political changes in 2025 following the formation of a new coalition government between the CDU/CSU and Social Democratic Party (SPD) under Chancellor Friedrich Merz. **Civil society welcomed the coalition agreement's commitment to maintaining development cooperation as an independent policy field,** as previous proposals from conservative politicians to merge the Federal Foreign Office and the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) had raised concerns about the future institutional independence of development policy.

However, the coalition agreement includes a commitment to reduce Germany's ODA contributions by **an unspecified "appropriate" amount. At the same time, the government introduced a marked shift in development policy priorities.** Under the new Federal Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development, Reem Alabali Radovan, the BMZ deprioritised its previous feminist development cooperation approach and launched a reform process that culminated in the presentation of a new strategy in early 2026.

The reform reorients German development cooperation around four priorities: ending hunger, poverty and inequality; promoting peace and stability; strengthening economic cooperation; and building strategic alliances. Cooperation is expected to become more geographically concentrated, focusing on a smaller number of strategically relevant Majority World countries, particularly in Africa, the European neighbourhood and the Middle East.

Budget cuts continue

Despite growing global development and humanitarian needs, Germany continued to reduce its development cooperation and

41 https://venro.org/publikationen/detail/oda-unter-druck

humanitarian budget in 2025, while significantly expanding military spending. Civil society organisations criticised the ongoing cuts, particularly the reduction of humanitarian assistance to EUR 1 billion–around 70% below 2022 levels and representing only 0.2% of the federal budget. Furthermore, **Germany has not shown any initiative to use its new position as the world's biggest provider to shape the international development policy landscape – after the Trump administration dismantled USAID.** However, the coalition agreement includes the commitment to set-up a "North-South Commission" to update development policy, which has yet to be implemented. The German development sector remained under pressure from far-right actors, including through disinformation campaigns aimed at undermining public support for international cooperation.

Government's relationship with civil society

The political climate became increasingly hostile in the beginning of 2025 when parts of the Conservative Party (CDU/CSU) adopted an anti-NGO narrative, following increasing hostility from far-right actors towards civil society organisations. In the field of international cooperation, the government increasingly emphasised the role of the private sector as a key development actor. Nevertheless, cooperation between government and civil society remained strong in many areas. Despite shrinking financial resources, CSOs continue to be recognised as important partners in the implementation of Germany's development and humanitarian policies, contributing expertise, local partnerships and public support for international cooperation.

Recommendations

→ **Reverse cuts to development cooperation and humanitarian assistance** and establish a pathway towards meeting international commitments.

→ **Protect civic space, support civil society participation in policy-making** and counter autocratic attempts to restrict civil society work.

→ **Increase and scale up international climate finance** in line with Germany's fair share of global climate action (EUR 12 billion per year by 2030).

Hungary

Reported ODA: EUR 245 million
0.14% GNI (↑ from 0.09% in 2024)

Non-inflated ODA: EUR 241 million
0.14% GNI (↑ 53.3% difference with 2024)

Total inflated ODA: EUR 4 million
1.4% of total

National Platform: **HAND Association**

The political transition following the April 2026 elections offers Hungary a unique opportunity to reset its development policy.

Main trends

Hungary's ODA continued to show significant volatility. According to OECD DAC data, Hungary's ODA amounted to USD 278 million (0.13% of GNI) in 2023, before falling sharply to USD 190 million (0.09% of GNI) in 2024. In 2025, however, reported ODA rebounded to USD 303 million (0.14% of GNI), representing a 45% increase compared to 2024, contrasting the overall trend among major OECD DAC providers, whose combined ODA declined substantially in 2025.

These fluctuations suggest that Hungarian ODA remains driven by ad hoc budgetary and political decisions rather than predictable, strategic planning or a more ambitious development policy. The absence of a transparent multiannual programming system means that ODA is still largely compiled through ex post statistical reporting instead of being guided by measurable development objectives and long-term priorities. This highlights the lack of stability and predictability of Hungary's ODA architecture. While Hungary continues to maintain dedicated institutional structures for development and humanitarian assistance, strategic planning, public accountability and policy coherence remain weak.

The parliamentary elections **of April 2026 and the resulting change of government provide an opportunity to fundamentally reform Hungary's development cooperation system.** A more strategic approach should include transparent planning, regular monitoring and evaluation, stronger alignment with international effectiveness principles, and structured engagement with civil society and other actors. This would improve both the quality and credibility of Hungary's contribution to global sustainable development.

Government's relationship with civil society

During the **final years of the previous government, policy dialogue with civil society organisations almost completely ceased.** The new 5-year development cooperation strategy was prepared and adopted without any meaningful public consultation, despite repeated requests from civil society.

Following the change of government in **April 2026, relations with CSOs have become noticeably more constructive across several policy areas.** Initial consultations have already begun in some sectors, and the new minister responsible for development cooperation has indicated that dialogue with development actors will be initiated sometime in the autumn of 2026. Although the new government's priorities in international development are not yet fully defined, CSOs welcome these signals and are ready to contribute their expertise. The coming period offers an important opportunity to institutionalise regular consultation and build a genuine multistakeholder partnership.

Recommendations

→ **Establish a transparent, evidence-based and participatory system** for planning, implementing, monitoring and evaluating Hungary's development cooperation.

→ **Create a permanent multistakeholder consultation mechanism** and institutionalise regular dialogue with civil society throughout the policy cycle.

→ **Introduce predictable, long-term and flexible funding opportunities** for civil society organisations, including core support.

→ **Develop and implement a national strategy for Global Citizenship Education,** integrating it across the education system and ensuring sustainable financing.

Ireland

Reported ODA: EUR 1745 million
0.42% GNI (↓ from 0.56% in 2024)

Non-inflated ODA: EUR 1193 million
0.29% GNI (↓ −12.4% difference with 2024)

Total inflated ODA: EUR 552 million
30.4% of total

National Platform: **Dóchas**

A committed partner, with focus on quality, grant-based ODA particularly in Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Fragile and Conflict-Affected States (FCAS).

National report on ODA
Irish Aid Annual Report 2024[42]
Dóchas Paper - Ireland as a Model Power[43]

Main trends

Since 2015, Ireland has maintained a consistent level of ODA spending, leading to its non-inflated ODA spending averaging 0.32% of GNI. This translated to significant increases in spending volumes due to a positive economic climate. Spending peaked in 2023 when global ODA reached 0.67% of GNI. While in the 2025 budget, Ireland increased its ODA spending by EUR 30 million, OECD DAC preliminary figures for 2025 indicate a drop of 22.5% in ODA spending, with Ireland's spending of USD 1.969 billion representing 0.42% of GNI. The reduction is mainly related to a drop in bilateral ODA, particularly in-donor refugee costs.

Ireland has reiterated its commitment to maintain current levels of ODA spending but has not as yet indicated any increases for 2027. Climate finance, while being of good quality and primarily grant-based, continues to be counted as non-additional ODA, which is an issue that should be rectified.

In terms of channels of delivery, direct funding to CSOs has been steadily decreasing, with funding increasingly directed to multilateral organisations and other channels of cooperation. While this may indirectly reach CSOs working in Majority World countries, it does not adequately reflect the Irish government's commitment to a vibrant civil society, that is a critical partner in the attainment of its objectives.

Government's relationship with civil society

The Irish government values its relationship with civil society, and attributes many of its successes

42 https://www.ireland.ie/en/irish-aid/news-and-publications/annual-reports/annual-report-archive/annual-report-2024/
43 https://dochas.ie/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Docas-Ireland-as-a-Model-Power-digital-final.pdf

to its close relationship with civil society, which both sides value and foster. **The relationship was enhanced through the establishment in recent years of two dedicated funding streams for civil society** - Ireland's Civil Society Partnership for A Better World (ICSP), a funding scheme for 10 partners with significant capacity, and the Civil Society Fund, that supports smaller CSOs. The current ICSP programme runs from 2023-2027. **Irish Aid plans to undertake a review during the course of 2026, and has committed to a full consultation process** with participating partners, with a view to informing the design of a future funding scheme. Each of the partners will also undertake an early end evaluation for the same purpose.

There is a strong focus on demonstrating the impact of Ireland's ODA spending and Irish Aid's programme, to support additional commitments to ODA by the government, and civil society organisations are actively engaged in supporting this work.

Recommendations

→ **Make real progress to achieve the commitment of 0.7% of Gross National Income (GNI) on ODA.** Increase the ODA budget, excluding In-Donor Refugee Costs (IDRC), by 10% in 2027. This is the equivalent of EUR 132 m.

→ **Setting out a clear pathway to achieve the 0.7% target** through increasing the ODA budget, excluding IDRC, by 10% year on year.

→ **Increase overall international climate finance contributions** to meet Ireland's fair share of the existing global target, to at least EUR 500 million per year. This should increase under the augmented New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG). Meanwhile, make a separate and specific commitment to financing the Loss and Damage Fund.

→ **Ireland's commitment to a vibrant civil society should be strengthened with concrete action and consistent, long-term funding to support NGOs** that work directly with affected communities in building long-term resilience. The **channels of delivery of ODA spending are a critical element in Ireland's credibility and overall foreign policy strategy.** Civil Society is a key partner in reaching and engaging with communities on the ground.

Italy

Reported ODA: EUR 6067 million
0.30% GNI (↑ from 0.29% in 2024)

Non-inflated ODA: EUR 4613 million
0.23% GNI (↑ 4.7% difference with 2024)

Total inflated ODA: EUR 1454 million
23% of total

National Platform: **Concord Italy**

Holding the line in difficult times: the challenge is turning resilience into momentum.

Main trends

Italy's development cooperation is navigating a period of significant institutional transition. While **ODA remained broadly stable (0.30% in 2025), Italy continues to fall well short of the internationally agreed target of 0.7% of Gross National Income (GNI) to ODA.** At the same time, the implementation of the **Mattei Plan for Africa has increased the political prominence of development cooperation,** raising important questions about policy coherence, transparency, and Majority World country ownership.

These challenges are reflected in the findings of the 2026 OECD DAC Peer Review of Italy, which provides a clear roadmap for strengthening the development cooperation system. Its recommendations include, establishing a credible pathway towards the 0.7% ODA/GNI target, improving institutional effectiveness and whole-of-government policy coherence, enhancing transparency and accountability, and strengthening partnerships with civil society.

Government's relationship with civil society

The relationship between **CSOs and Italy's development cooperation institutions remains active,** structured and characterised by engagement across multiple levels of the cooperation system. Preparations for the National Conference on Development Cooperation (COOPERA) created opportunities for civil society to **contribute to discussions on the future of Italy's development cooperation.**

A significant development was the adoption of revised procedures governing Civil Society Organisation (CSO) access to Italian development cooperation funding. While it is still too early to assess their overall impact, the new framework responds to several longstanding concerns raised by civil society, including on localisation and partnerships with local actors. Its implementation will require close attention, particularly as discussions continue on the future of **Italy's financing architecture beyond the current model based predominantly on competitive calls for proposals.**

However, the broader civic space remains uneven. For instance, organisations working on migration and search-and-rescue operations continue to face political and operational constraints, highlighting the importance of safeguarding an enabling environment for civil society as a whole.

Recommendations

→ **Develop and implement an action plan to operationalise the recommendations of the 2026 OECD DAC Peer Review** of Italy's development cooperation.

→ **Adopt a credible, time-bound roadmap to achieve the 0.7% ODA/GNI target,** with particular attention to increasing support for least developed countries.

→ Ensure that the Mattei Plan for Africa is fully integrated within Italy's development cooperation architecture, **rather than creating parallel mechanisms or priorities.**

→ Ensure that all development cooperation policies and instruments, including those implemented through the Mattei Plan for Africa, are transparent, accountable, country-led and **aligned with internationally agreed development effectiveness principles.**

→ **Consolidate meaningful partnerships with civil society,** including through the effective implementation of the new CSO funding procedures and sustained institutional dialogue.

Latvia

Reported ODA: EUR 71 million
0.18% GNI (↓ from 0.22% in 2024)

Non-inflated ODA: EUR 52 million
0.13% GNI (↓ –27.8% difference with 2024)

Total inflated ODA: EUR 19 million
26.2% of total

National Platform: **Latvian Platform for Development Cooperation LAPAS**

More projects, less money: Latvia's ODA is spreading thinner, not deeper.

National report on ODA

Opinion papers by LAPAS and members in policy recommendations, refugee costs, gender and digitalisation, role of private sector and localisation[44]

Main trends

In 2025, Latvia's ODA fell by **9.0%,** partly due to lower multilateral contributions, according to the OECD's preliminary attribution. This channel generally receives less public scrutiny than bilateral, project-based aid. **Bilateral ODA to Ukraine bucked the overall trend, increasing from USD 7 million in 2024 (25.8% of bilateral ODA) to USD 10 million in 2025 (27.3%).** Humanitarian assistance within this allocation nearly tripled, reaching **USD 8 million.** This continues the upward trend seen since 2023 and reflects the sustained political priority given to Ukraine and the Eastern Partnership.

In-donor refugee costs declined by around 18% in nominal terms from 2023 to 2024, but their share of total ODA remained broadly stable—and even increased slightly—from **31.4% to 32.5%,** as overall ODA fell faster.

Latvia's development cooperation portfolio also expanded. The **Central Finance and Contracting Agency (CFLA) 's EU/EC-funded project pipeline grew from one new project in 2023 and in 2024 to three in 2025,** with a further six projects approved or planned for 2026 following its Pillar Assessment accreditation. Its state-funded Ukraine/Chernihiv portfolio followed a similar trajectory, increasing from **three projects in 2024 to seven in 2025.**

Overall, Latvia implemented **41 bilateral development cooperation projects in 2025,** including **16 focused on Ukraine,** highlighting the continued centrality of Ukraine to Latvia's development cooperation.

Government's relationship with civil society

Latvia's relationship with government stakeholders has evolved from ad hoc contact **into a more structured partnership.** The

44 https://lapas.lv/works/projekti/anm-2023-2025/

Development Cooperation Policy Consultative Council brings together government, business, and civil-society stakeholders, though its potential as a genuine expert body remains underdeveloped, with participation still largely formal rather than substantive.

LAPAS holds a seat on this Council, sits on the advisory board of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and takes part in the bilateral project call committee. LAPAS, together with six member organisations, implemented the "Effective and Responsible Development Cooperation Financing", a project (2023–2025) on financing for global partnerships. **In 2025, LAPAS and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) co-organised a series of events on impact assessment, localisation, and the security perspective of ODA.** A more troubling engagement example is the CFLA: its decision-making on project partners and experts remains opaque, **a concern first flagged in AidWatch reporting on 2023 and still unresolved as its role in ODA administration expands.**

Recommendations

→ **Make CFLA's decision-making transparent:** publish selection criteria for project partners and experts.

→ **Publish the rationale and expected results behind Latvia's multilateral contributions to funds and programmes.**

→ **Set out a public roadmap for Latvia's ODA policy and financing model** beyond 2027, including how the 0.23%-by-2027 and 0.33%-by-2030 targets will be met given the 2025 decline.

→ **Co-develop with LAPAS a proportionate impact-assessment system for development cooperation projects, scalable enough to fit smaller grants** (e.g., the EUR 40,000–100,000 open-call range) alongside larger EU-delegated and state-funded projects.

Lithuania

Reported ODA: EUR 158 million
0.21% GNI (↓ from 0.24% in 2024)

Non-inflated ODA: EUR 142 million
0.19% GNI (↓ –12.9% difference with 2024)

Total inflated ODA: EUR 16 million
9.7% of total

National Platform:
Lithuanian NGDO Platform

From consultation to co-creation — from principles to practice.

Main trends

In 2025, Lithuania's Official Development Assistance (ODA) continued the downward trend observed since the peak of support following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Preliminary OECD data show that Lithuania provided **€164 million in ODA, equivalent to 0.21% of GNI, representing a 9.7% real-terms decrease compared with 2024.** This continues the decline in Lithuania's ODA/GNI ratio from **0.28% in 2023 to 0.24% in 2024 and 0.21% in 2025,** moving further away from Lithuania's commitment to reach **0.33% of GNI by 2030.** The factors driving the trend have evolved. In previous years, Lithuania's ODA levels were strongly influenced by **exceptional support to Ukraine and in-donor refugee costs,** which contributed significantly to the sharp increases in 2022–2023. As these exceptional expenditures declined, ODA also fell. In 2025, however, the trend increasingly reflects a broader issue of limited and insufficiently growing allocations, rather than simply the reduction of exceptional refugee-related expenditure. Looking ahead, the key challenge is whether Lithuania can reverse this trajectory and move towards its 0.33% ODA/GNI commitment by 2030. The new 2026–2030 International Partnerships Guidelines provide an opportunity to improve **the quality, strategic focus and effectiveness of Lithuania's cooperation,** but this needs to be matched by adequate and predictable financial resources. Lithuania is becoming more strategic in how it uses development cooperation, but the declining ODA/GNI ratio risks limiting the ambition and scale of that strategy.

Government's relationship with civil society

The relationship between the Lithuanian government and civil society in development cooperation is **moving towards greater partnership and co-creation, but remains only partially institutionalised.** The 2026–2030 Strategic Guidelines formally recognise NGOs as "equal partners" in the formulation and implementation of international partnerships policy and establish co-creation as a guiding principle. The National Development Cooperation Commission (NVBK) is also envisaged as a whole-of-society forum, while NGOs have gained access to formats such as the Practitioners'

Club, Global Gateway discussions, regional policy consultations and the NGO mission to Ukraine. There are positive signs that this relationship is becoming more collaborative. The government plans to strengthen the NVBK and provide resources for NGO participation in the EU Council Presidency period and the annual development cooperation conference. The proposed Qualified Applicants Platform could further deepen cooperation by involving NGOs earlier in the design of funding calls and allowing structured feedback on programme concepts.

Recommendations

→ **Institutionalise meaningful civil society participation throughout the policy cycle.** Move beyond ad hoc and bilateral consultations by establishing a predictable mechanism for NGO involvement in agenda-setting, policy design, implementation and review.

→ **Turn the co-creation principle into a practical mechanism.** The government should involve NGOs earlier in the design of development cooperation funding instruments and calls, including through structured consultations on priorities, draft concepts and implementation arrangements.

→ **Create more predictable and strategic financing for experienced NGOs.** Building on the progress on repayable grants and the planned Qualified Applicants Platform, the government should introduce longer-term, larger-scale programme funding and consider core or institutional funding for strategically important civil society organisations.

→ **Establish systematic feedback, learning and accountability mechanisms.** The government should regularly collect and publish feedback from NGOs and project implementers on the accessibility, administration and effectiveness of development cooperation instruments.

Luxembourg

Reported ODA: EUR 576 million
0.99% GNI (↓ from 1% in 2024)

Non-inflated ODA: EUR 576 million
0.99% GNI (↑ 4.3% difference with 2024)

Total inflated ODA: EUR 0 million
0.0% of total

National Platform:
Cercle de Coopération des ONGD

Luxembourg remains a leading provider, safeguarding ODA integrity amid growing pressure.

Main trends

In 2025, Luxembourg maintained its commitment to allocating approximately 1% of its Gross National Income (GNI) to ODA. Luxembourg **still stays committed delivering ODA almost exclusively through grants while ensuring its ODA remains 100% untied.** Operationally, the country has recently streamlined its strategic focus, concentrating its primary efforts on three official Majority World countries: Senegal, Cabo Verde and Laos. In addition to these, Luxembourg's development cooperation programme supports projects in 12 countries, known as "project countries". Luxembourg continues to prioritise Least Developed Countries (LDCs), fragile contexts, and marginalised communities, thereby preserving a poverty-focused approach to development.

Despite consistent efforts in recent years to ensure that ODA remains in line with these principles, the principle of **additionality has gradually been debated and called into question in political circles;** however, by the end of 2025, the government had not yet taken a clear stance on the matter.

The government **actively promotes innovative financial instruments designed to attract private investment for projects delivering social and environmental benefits** in Majority World countries. These initiatives include impact funds as well as blended finance mechanisms. On this subject, the latest Luxembourg OECD DAC Peer Review, published in 2025, emphasises **the necessity of ensuring that this growing reliance on blended finance and private sector engagement remains strictly aligned with sustainable development objectives, without diluting core poverty reduction priorities.** Furthermore, the report notes that current mechanisms for identifying and resolving structural inconsistencies across public policies–such as finance, trade, and development–remain inadequate and require further refinement.

Government's relationship with civil society

The relationship between Luxembourg's government and civil society **remains generally constructive,** characterised by regular meetings–notably through a dedicated working group bridging the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, Defence, Development Cooperation and Foreign Trade (MFA) and development NGOs. CSOs continue to benefit from regular consultation mechanisms, though a more proactive and meaningful participation in strategic issues could be further encouraged. **The MFA has provided both financial and political backing for the creation of a "Maison des ONGD",** which will house the Cercle de Coopération and around 10 Luxembourgish development NGOs to enhance synergies and visibility of the sector.

The Luxembourg OECD DAC Peer Review recognised the valuable contribution of civil society to Luxembourg's development cooperation system and highlighted the importance of maintaining meaningful stakeholder engagement through dialogue between government and civil society.

Recommendations

→ **Reaffirm and institutionalise Luxembourg's commitment to ODA additionality** by continuing to exclude in-donor refugee costs and ensuring that international climate finance remains additional to the international development cooperation budget.

→ **Maintain ODA at a minimum of 1% of GNI** and provide predictable multiannual budget commitments for international cooperation.

→ **Ensure that blended finance, innovative finance mechanisms and private sector engagement** are fully aligned with human development objectives, human rights standards and poverty reduction goals.

→ **Strengthen policy coherence for sustainable development** across all government policies, including financial, fiscal, climate and trade policies, and increase support for sustainable domestic resource mobilisation in Majority World countries. Strengthen the role of civil society in this process, as recommended in the OECD DAC peer review.

Malta

Reported ODA: EUR 43 million
0.21% GNI (↓ from 0.29% in 2024)

Non-inflated ODA: EUR 43 million
0.21% GNI (↓ −23.2% difference with 2024)

Total inflated ODA: EUR 0 million
0.0% of total

National Platform:
SKOP Malta - Solidarjetà u Koperazzjoni

Malta's development cooperation budget shrinks in volume, in transparency and in dialogue.

Main trends

For the second year running, Malta's reporting rests exclusively on OECD's preliminary release, as **no report or policy document has been published to contextualise them,** making it impossible to assess whether ODA expenditure and government's performance in 2025 reflects any shift in priorities. **This opacity is compounded by the state of public ODA reporting more broadly:** as of writing, not a single ministry, including the Ministry for Foreign and European Affairs, has published its 2025 annual report.

The result is that it is not possible to reliably identify a trend for 2025 or assess whether the factors driving Malta's ODA allocations have changed. This inability is, in itself, the clearest indication of the current situation: the system has become less transparent and less timely, making meaningful reflection and stocktaking increasingly difficult.

Government's relationship with civil society

The relationship between government and civil society in Malta has arguably deteriorated. While in previous years meetings started to take place again (even though invariably initiated by SKOP) and **discussions seemed to take a constructive direction, these have now stopped.**

Most tellingly, the **results of the 2025 ODA call for proposals have still not been published,** despite SKOP being aware that some of its member organisations submitted proposals. It is regrettable to see a pattern of consultation promised in policy documents but withheld in practice.

Recommendations

None of last year's recommendations were addressed, even partially. We reiterate them, sharpened, and add a transparency-specific demand made ever more necessary and urgent:

→ **Publish ODA data and reporting proactively, the results of the annual ODA**

Call, and Malta's Creditor Reporting System (CRS) / Total Official Support for Sustainable Development (CRS/TOSSD) submissions rather than leaving civil society and the public dependent on OECD's database.

→ **Establish a structured, recurring dialogue with civil society,** initiated by government rather than requested by CSOs, to discuss ODA policy, priorities and reporting on an ongoing basis.

→ **Ensure predictable, multiannual funding for poverty-eradication projects** proposed by Maltese CSOs, and provide direct capacity support to SKOP to strengthen the sector's capacities.

→ **Stop counting in-donor refugee costs as ODA.**

The Netherlands

Reported ODA: EUR 6340 million
0.58% GNI (↓ from 0.62% in 2024)

Non-inflated ODA: EUR 5270 million
0.49% GNI (↓ –6.1% difference with 2024)

Total inflated ODA: EUR 1069 million
16.2% of total

National Platform: **Partos**

Two years of decline, opportunity for restoration.

National report on ODA
The Power of Partnerships: 27 Stories of Civil Society Driving Change.[45]

Main trends

In 2024 the Dutch Government **suspended their commitment to the pledge to spend 0.7% GDP on development cooperation, which resulted in a further decline in ODA spending in 2025.** Due to multiannual commitments, the announced budget cuts resulted in a steady decline, with ODA representing 0.58% of GDP. Throughout 2025, the Dutch Government has refused to reinstate the pledge towards the 0.7%, even when supported by the majority of the Parliament. In fact, during the election campaign preceding the October Parliamentary Elections, 10 political parties pledged to reinstate the 0.7%, and **they now hold a majority who has the opportunity to transform this budget cuts trend in the coming year.**

The **end of 2025 also marked the end of the five year long Strategic Partnerships-program.** Within this framework, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs supported 42 strategic partnerships with CSOs to foster sustainable systemic change. We look back on five years of collaboration marked by extraordinary international challenges, including a global pandemic, armed conflict, and economic uncertainty. Experimenting with new forms of collaboration was at times bumpy, but brought many learning opportunities. These years were also filled with shared responsibility, progress, and impact.

Government's relationship with civil society

There is a strong tradition of cooperation between the Government and CSOs, however in the Netherlands there is also an increased pressure on civic space. In political discourse we see an increase in framing CSO's as disruptive or radical. We argue that these organisations are vital not only as partners in implementation of policies under ODA but also to a healthy democracy. CSOs fulfil varying roles, and the

45 https://partos.maglr.com/the-power-of-partnerships/cover

one of critical watchdog and valued participant in democratic process is one that should be safeguarded. Additionally, we hope that a change in government will increase dialogue and meaningful participation for civil society in the next year.

On top of this, many organisations face administrative burdens, increased scrutiny and are disproportionally targeted by the funding cuts. The end of 2025 signals the end of five year long strategic partnerships, but the new framework will not start until later in 2026. This means organisations will face a significant funding gap, uncertainty and possibly more loss of financing.

Recommendations

→ Global challenges demand stronger international cooperation

Climate change, conflict, migration and pandemics do not respect borders, meeting them requires sustained cooperation across countries. Global challenges call for deeper international collaboration and long-term investment in resilience, not short-term or fragmented responses.

→ Make equal partnerships the guiding principle

Decision-making, knowledge, and influence should be distributed more equitably. Only this way can international cooperation align with the changes in global balance of power. This requires the Dutch government and organisations to continually assess their own role, ensuring meaningful engagement with civil society in the development, implementation and evaluation of foreign policy. Civil society organisations in the Netherlands and elsewhere in the world can voice the concerns for those affected by these policies, and should be included in the decision-making process.

→ Embed policy coherence for development in policy review

Trade, investment, climate, agriculture, migration, tax, and security policies can reinforce development goals, but they can also undermine them. In a world where issues are increasingly intertwined, policy coherence is not a technical issue, but a strategic necessity.

→ Reinstate the commitment to 0.7%

As one of the twenty founding countries of the OECD DAC, the Netherlands has been committed to the target of 0.7% GDP spent on ODA for over fifty years. This commitment must be reinstated to remain a credible international partner and to provide sufficient funding to achieve these goals.

Poland

Reported ODA: EUR 1322 million
0.16% GNI (↓ from 0.21% in 2024)

Non-inflated ODA: EUR 980 million
0.12% GNI (↓ –31.6% difference with 2024)

Total inflated ODA: EUR 342 million
24.8% of total

National Platform: **Grupa Zagranica**

Poland's ODA: Diminishing commitments and stagnant partnerships.

National report on ODA
Poland's ODA: Diminishing commitments and stagnant partnerships

Main trends

In 2025, Poland allocated PLN[46] 6.1 billion for development assistance: PLN 2.1 billion in bilateral ODA (34%) and approximately PLN 4 billion in multilateral ODA (66%), i.e. through international institutions mainly through EU budget.

Poland's ODA was lower in 2025 than in the previous year (-19%), primarily due to lower costs of supporting refugees. Polish ODA accounted for only 0.16% of Poland's GNI. This is only slightly more than in 2021 (0.15% ODA/GNI), the year preceding the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Polish development and humanitarian aid for Ukraine amounted to PLN 0.68 billion in 2024, decreasing down from PLN 0.97 billion in 2023. Assistance to refugees amounted to PLN 0.83 billion, representing 13.6% of total Polish ODA for that year.

Polish ODA for 2025 reflects a broader trend visible across the European Union and globally: **a reduction in the scale of support and a gradual shift away from the fundamental goal of development cooperation, which is the reduction of poverty.** This is also confirmed by specific decisions of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, such as reducing the number of priority countries for Polish Aid from 2026, including Senegal and Ethiopia. After a short period of mobilisation related to the war in Ukraine and significant support for refugees from Ukraine under Polish ODA, Poland is effectively returning to the starting point from before 2022. Development cooperation remained a minor element of the State's external actions.

Government's relationship with civil society

While Polish NGOs had the opportunity to collaborate with government stakeholders

46 The złoty (PLN) is the Polish currency.

in 2025 – particularly during Poland's EU Presidency, including joint activities within the European Humanitarian Forum – **the overall situation in terms of financial cooperation did not improve.** In 2025, no main call for proposals for development assistance projects under Polish Aid was organised. Funds were allocated only to projects in the 'second modules' of the call concluded in 2024.

The programme of cooperation between the Minister of Foreign Affairs and CSOs for 2026-30, adopted in 2025, did not bring any qualitative change. It remained merely a list of general principles for cooperation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and NGOs, failing to address the NGO community's demands for the document to be based on a current analysis and diagnosis of the potential and needs of NGOs operating in key areas of Polish foreign policy and public diplomacy (including mapping organisations and creating an expert/competence database within the organisations).

Recommendations

➜ **Reversing the decline in development funding by establishing a legally binding, incremental roadmap to meet Poland's international ODA/Gross National Income (GNI) commitments,** ensuring that the post-2022 regression is urgently corrected through predictable, programmable ODA allocations independent of inflated in-donor refugee costs.

➜ **Enhancing the engagement of CSOs in policy-shaping processes** and the implementation of government-funded projects in the areas of development cooperation and global education.

➜ **Developing country strategic frameworks for each priority Majority World country,** as well as a strategy for global education, grounded in meaningful consultations with stakeholders and civil society organisations.

➜ **Providing institutional support and capacity building for NGOs,** including dedicated assistance for the civil society sector in leveraging funds from the EU budget and other institutional providers.

Portugal

Reported ODA: EUR 468 million
0.18% GNI (↓ from 0.22% in 2024)

Non-inflated ODA: EUR 452 million
0.17% GNI (↓ -23.8% difference with 2024)

Total inflated ODA: EUR 16 million
3.4% of total

National Platform: **Portuguese Platform of Development NGOs**

Portuguese ODA is declining in quantity, with quality concerns persisting.

Main trends

Portuguese ODA declined from 0.22% of Gross National Income (GNI) in 2024 (OECD final data) to 0.18% in 2025 (OECD preliminary data), with cuts affecting both the multilateral and bilateral programmes.

This downward trend is occurring against a backdrop of rising defence spending: **Portugal must ensure that the increase in defence investment does not come at the expense of ODA.** The recently presented **Roadmap for Sustainable Development 2030** includes concrete targets for defence spending - specifically, reaching 5% of GDP - but fails to include the international target of 0.7% of GNI for ODA, suggesting an imbalance in political priorities.

On the strategic front, although the Portuguese Cooperation Strategy 2030 was approved back in 2022, there has so far been no public reporting or communication on its implementation or the results achieved. An implementation and monitoring plan for the strategy should be developed, with clearly defined objectives, indicators and targets, to be discussed and shared with key stakeholders, particularly CSOs.

Finally, in light of the announced restructuring of **Camões IP, the Portuguese Development Agency, it is essential that its role, including its funding capacity, as the coordinating body for Portuguese cooperation be strengthened,** and that dialogue and joint work with civil society be maintained throughout this process of institutional change.

Government's relationship with civil society

The platform acknowledges **the openness to dialogue shown by key actors in Portuguese cooperation,** including the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation and Camões I.P. Dialogue with Camões I.P., has been particularly open, relevant and effective, translating into concrete outcomes for the platform's members and Non-Governmental Development Organisations (NGDOs) more broadly, as seen in the all-of-society format adopted for the National

Strategy for Development Education (ENED), and joint work on NGDO funding.

Funding for NGDO projects, maintained in 2025, rose slightly in 2026. Still, funding must be increased and adapted to NGDOs' needs, through predictable, transparent, multiannual mechanisms covering institutional and programme support. Civil society's involvement in shaping cooperation policy should be strengthened.

A **positive step was this year's Cooperation Forum meeting, not held since 2023** and long demanded by NGDOs. This consultative body fosters coordination between public institutions and development actors. However, meeting attendance was low, and the Forum needs to be strengthened, including with the participation of non-permanent members such as NGDOs.

Recommendations

→ **Strengthen the commitment to the 0.7% GNI target** and set a clear implementation timeline, ensuring **the quality of ODA and preserving its primary focus on poverty reduction in Majority World countries,** especially Least Developed Countries (LDCs), while avoiding the use of ODA to pursue other objectives, such as migration management or security.

→ **Promote the fundamental role of NGDOs in the development sector,** namely by strengthening their funding and participation in public policy formulation.

→ **Promote ownership by Majority World countries,** as provided for in the Portuguese Cooperation Strategy 2030.

→ **Strengthen intergovernmental coordination through the Inter-ministerial Commission for Cooperation,** giving it a more active role in ensuring policy coherence for development and coordinating sectoral actions. To this end, the Commission should meet more frequently and enforce transparency, by publicising the meetings' agenda and subjects discussed. It should set clear objectives that ensure all public entities align with ODA priorities, promoting a "whole-of-government approach" to meeting the international target of 0.7% of GNI for development assistance.

Slovakia

Reported ODA: EUR 164 million
0.13% GNI (↓ from 0.14% in 2024)

Non-inflated ODA: EUR 163 million
0.13% GNI (↓ –7.9% difference with 2024)

Total inflated ODA: EUR 1 million
0.5% of total

National Platform: **Ambrela – Platform for Development Organisations**

National report on ODA
Defunding of Non-Governmental Non-Profit Organizations in Slovakia in 2024-2025[47]
OECD Development Co-operation Peer Reviews: Slovak Republic 2025[48]
Ambrela AidWatch – Hodnotiaca správa 2022-2024 (Ambrela AidWatch – Evaluation Report 2022-2024)[49]
Výročná správa SAMRS 2025 (SAIDC Annual Report 2025)[50]

Main trends

The Slovak ODA system is currently facing a critical period defined by **drastic defunding** of NGOs and a strategic shift away from solidarity toward **economic diplomacy.** Despite the international commitment to reach 0.33% Gross National Income (GNI) by 2030, Slovak ODA remains stagnant at a critical 0.13% of GNI (approx. EUR 180 million). Furthermore, **the real value of Slovak ODA has dropped by one-fifth over the last three years due to inflation.**

The primary trend in 2024 and 2025 was the implementation of unpredictable budget cuts. In 2024, bilateral grants were slashed by nearly 70% mid-year, severely undermining the country's predictability and bilateral footprint in Majority World countries and potentially its credibility as a partner. In 2025, NGOs lost access to approximately EUR 1.5 to 2.5 million as funds were redirected to the private sector. **The budget for the Business Partnership Programme (PPP) tripled to EUR 1.8 million, while funding for public-benefit projects implemented by civil society plummeted.**

Institutional fragmentation remains a significant challenge. While the new Medium-Term Strategy (2025–2030) narrows the geographic focus to 19 countries, development activities remain scattered across various ministries that often plan their ODA budgets and projects in isolation. Furthermore, the expansion of **business grants,** which lack specific geographic or thematic focus,risks further dissipating limited resources. While **ODA to Ukraine** remains a declared priority, the overall system is increasingly instrumentalised

47 https://osf.sk/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Defunding-of-NGOs-in-SLovakia_2024_25_ENG.pdf
48 https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/11/oecd-development-co-operation-peer-reviews-slovak-republic-2025_0b36ad0b/b52e98a2-en.pdf
49 https://ambrela.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Ambrela_Aidwatch_report_2025.pdf
50 https://slovakaid.sk/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/vyr_sprava_SAMRS_final_300dpi.pdf

as a tool for economic interests rather than sustainable development goals. At its core, this fragmentation stems from an **internal crisis of direction** under this government where fundamental values, including **solidarity,** are traded for **immediate economic interests** and **populist "sovereignty" rhetoric.**

Government relationship with civil society

The relationship between the government and civil society reached a historical low in 2025. While technical communication channels with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs nominally remain open, the general environment has become **openly hostile due to restrictive policies, including an adopted "foreign agent" law by Parliament that was ruled unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court in 2026,** a transactional tax threat, intrusive government audits and controls, and disinformation and smearing campaigns.

In a move unprecedented in the history of SlovakAid, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) **refused to sign an operational grant for the platform Ambrela** in 2025, despite its high expert evaluation, and declared the cancellation of this call for proposals for 2026. NGOs are increasingly excluded from participatory processes and face public stigmatisation. Paradoxically, the state continues to request expert inputs from Ambrela for strategic tasks, such as the humanitarian rapid response mechanism, while simultaneously stripping the sector of the financial support necessary to maintain such expertise. **This "defunding" approach directly erodes the long-term infrastructure of Slovak development cooperation.**

Recommendations

→ **Restore inclusive political dialogue** and stop the introduction of restrictive legislation or administrative measures that stigmatize and burden development NGOs.

→ **Ensure stable and predictable funding** for NGOs through SAIDC grants, restoring levels to the 2022–2023 baseline to prevent further erosion of development impact.

→ **Establish a credible roadmap** with clear annual increments to reach the international commitment of 0.33% GNI by 2030.

→ **Modernise the rapid humanitarian response mechanism** by formally involving CSOs as strategic partners through framework agreements to enhance flexibility and speed.

Slovenia

Reported ODA: EUR 140 million
0.22% GNI (↓ from 0.23% in 2024)

Non-inflated ODA: EUR 118 million
0.19% GNI (↓ –6.3% difference with 2024)

Total inflated ODA: EUR 22 million
15.3% of total

National Platform: **SLOGA, Slovenian NGO platform for global development, global education and humanitarian aid**

Quality cooperation persists, but ODA ambition and funding require strengthening.

Main trends

Slovenia's ODA remained largely unchanged in 2025 but continued to decline from the peak reached in 2022, when it amounted to 0.29% of GNI. Indeed, in 2025, **Slovenia provided just under EUR 152 million in ODA, equivalent to 0.22% of GNI, compared with 0.23% in 2024** - according to the OECD DAC's preliminary statistics published in April 2026. **While the decrease was modest in nominal terms (0.7%), it amounted to 4.2% in real terms, after adjusting for inflation.** Slovenia therefore remains below its EU commitment to allocate 0.33% of Gross National Income (GNI) to ODA by 2030. Bilateral ODA continued to be driven by funding for development projects in Majority World countries, humanitarian assistance and imputed student costs. Multilateral ODA declined slightly, mainly due to lower Slovenian contributions through the EU ODA budget.

Geographically, Slovenia strengthened its focus on the European neighbourhood, while support to sub-Saharan Africa declined slightly. In 2026, Slovenia adopted an important institutional reform by integrating responsibility for international development cooperation and economic diplomacy within a single directorate of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs.

Government's relationship with civil society

The relationship between the Slovenian government and CSOs active in international development cooperation has **generally remained constructive, with gradual improvements in structured dialogue.** Development NGOs, coordinated through the national platform SLOGA, are recognised by the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs (MFEA) as important partners in policy dialogue, public awareness raising, global citizenship education, humanitarian action and the implementation of development cooperation programmes.

CSOs continue to call for more systematic involvement throughout the policy cycle, greater participation in strategic planning and more predictable financing. They also advocate for stronger political commitment to increasing Slovenia's ODA and ensuring that development cooperation remains guided by poverty reduction, human rights, sustainable development and humanitarian principles.

Recommendations

→ **Adopt a credible roadmap to meet Slovenia's ODA commitments.** Slovenia should develop a multiannual financing plan with clear annual milestones to progressively increase official development assistance in line with its international commitments. The roadmap should enhance the predictability, effectiveness and long-term impact of Slovenia's development cooperation.

→ **Ensure that economic diplomacy supports sustainable development objectives.** Slovenia should ensure that the integration of international development cooperation and economic diplomacy strengthens development policy objectives. This requires maintaining dedicated development expertise and clear criteria to ensure that economic diplomacy and private sector engagement contribute to sustainable development outcomes, in line with the Development Cooperation Act, OECD DAC recommendations and the EU Consensus on Development.

→ **Strengthen structured dialogue and predictable support for civil society organisations.** Slovenia should institutionalise regular, transparent and meaningful engagement with civil society throughout the policy cycle, including agenda setting, policy design, implementation and evaluation. It should also provide more predictable and multiannual financing for development NGOs to strengthen their sustainability, enhance their capacity to mobilise and implement EU development initiatives, and increase their contribution to Slovenia's role as an effective development partner.

Spain

Reported ODA: EUR 4264 million
0.27% GNI (↑ from 0.25% in 2024)

Non-inflated ODA: EUR 3578 million
0.23% GNI (↑ 1.1% difference with 2024)

Total inflated ODA: EUR 686 million
15.4% of total

National Platform: La Coordinadora de Organizaciones para el Desarrollo

A commitment to international cooperation in a challenging global context: institutional progress amid persistent financial shortfalls.

Main trends

Spain continues to rebuild its international development cooperation system, a decade after reaching a historic low of 0.12% of Gross National Income (GNI) in 2015. This progress is taking place in an increasingly challenging international context. **Against this backdrop, Spain has maintained an active position in defending multilateralism and international development financing.**

Throughout 2025 and 2026, the Government has continued to promote the implementation of the **Seville Commitment,** adopted at the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development, by leading and actively contributing to several of the working groups established under this framework. Spain has also strengthened its partnerships with multilateral organisations, notably through new agreements with United Nations entities and the decision by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to establish a sub-office in Madrid.

Regarding development cooperation policy, the **Law on Cooperation for Sustainable Development and Global Solidarity,** adopted in 2023 with broad political and social support, continues to guide an ongoing process of institutional strengthening. Progress has been made in reinforcing the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID), pending on the improvements included in its new Management Contract approved recently. During the past year, strategies on Feminist Cooperation, Culture for Sustainable Development and Multilateral Cooperation have been approved, while work has begun on strategies covering Peacebuilding, the Human Right to Food, Humanitarian Action and Global Citizenship Education. The Spanish Sustainable Development Fund (FEDES) has also become operational.

However, these institutional and policy advances continue to be unmatched by sufficient increases in funding. **Preliminary figures indicate that Spain's Official Development Assistance (ODA) reached 0.27% of GNI in 2025,** still far from the trajectory required to meet the legally established target of allocating 0.7% of GNI to ODA by 2030. There is also a growing concern over the potential increase in inflated aid due to the rising share of in-donor refugee costs reported as ODA.

Decentralised cooperation remains one of the fundamental pillars of the Spanish development cooperation system. However, recent years have seen increasingly uneven trends across Spain's regions, with significant setbacks in some and important progress in others, creating risks for the overall stability and predictability of the system.

Government's relationship with civil society

Relations between the Government and civil society organisations have generally remained positive and constructive, with stable dialogue mechanisms both through formal participation bodies and within regulatory and strategic policy-making processes.

La Coordinadora has actively participated in monitoring the implementation of the Cooperation Law, the establishment of the new High Council for International Development Cooperation, discussions on financing for development, the drafting of sectoral strategies, and various consultation processes related to humanitarian action, feminist cooperation, global citizenship education and the protection of human rights.

At the same time, **continuous dialogue has been maintained with different political parties** in an effort to preserve broad political consensus on development cooperation at a time of increasing political polarisation and confrontation. Another important aspect of this dialogue has been **the shared recognition of the need to actively defend international development cooperation.** Unfortunately, attacks by the far right against development cooperation and organised civil society have continued to grow in Spain, while civic space has come under increasing pressure in many of the countries where Spanish organisations operate. Consequently, the shared concern over the deteriorating conditions for civil society organisations and human rights defenders remains a central issue in dialogue with public institutions.

Recommendations

→ **Strengthen Spain's political leadership in defending international development cooperation, human rights and democratic multilateralism** in the face of growing geopolitical fragmentation and the weakening of international commitments. Continue contributing to the follow-up and implementation of the Seville Commitment.

→ **Establish a credible, transparent and binding budgetary pathway to reach the legal target of allocating 0.7% of GNI to ODA by 2030, including significant increases in 2026 and 2027 to reach at least 0.4% of GNI.** Ensure that ODA growth translates into additional, high-quality resources to tackle poverty, inequality and humanitarian crises, while progressively reducing the share of inflated aid. At the same time, **strengthen the contribution of decentralised cooperation, ensuring that it represents at least 10% of Spain's total ODA, with stable and progressively increasing funding commitments across all regional and local governments.**

→ **Strengthen and consolidate the Spanish cooperation system, by reinforcing the institutional, technical and financial capacities of AECID and regional and local governments,** completing the implementation of the Cooperation Law and Master Plan with its sectoral strategies, and improving coordination across government levels.

➔ **Ensure the effective and meaningful participation of organised civil society in the design, monitoring and evaluation of development cooperation policies,** as well as in the implementation of the international commitments arising from the Seville Conference and other multilateral processes.

Sweden

Reported ODA: EUR 4862 million
0.85% GNI (↑ from 0.79% in 2024)

Non-inflated ODA: EUR 4527 million
0.79% GNI (↑ 4.4% difference with 2024)

Total inflated ODA: EUR 335 million
6.6% of total

National Platform: **CONCORD Sweden**

Billions of kronor[51] cut from development assistance in the most marginalised countries.

Main trends

A trend currently re-shaping Sweden's role in the world is the **accelerating shift of development cooperation funds away from Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East.** The funding shift from these **countries to Ukraine accelerated in 2025 and is projected to continue in 2026.** The magnitude of this shift can be illustrated by the fact that in 5 years 61% of funds, or SEK 7 billion, was removed from country-level and regional cooperation in Africa.

In **2025, Sweden's ODA seemingly increased from 0.79% to 0.85% of GNI. This is mainly explained by a technical issue, where Sweden reports a large, multi-year core support to the Green Climate Fund (GCF)** according to the DAC rules for loans. The whole value is reported as ODA in the year the promissory note was issued, even if the ODA spending occurs over multiple years in the national budget. **Without the effect of this technicality, Sweden's ODA continued downward in 2025. Between 2025 and 2026, there was also a budget cut of SEK 3 billion to the overall ODA budget.** Sweden remains one of the few countries still above the 0.7% of Gross National Income (GNI) for international aid, but could fail to meet that commitment in a few years.

The **share of the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida)'s development assistance targeting gender was similar in 2025 compared to 2024,** but in absolute numbers continued decreasing. This is due to a reduced budget for Sida and more decisions on development cooperation spending made directly by the government. **Migration policies and export promotion continue to influence ODA, with a new, high-budget migration strategy for development cooperation with goals that heavily emphasise migration control.** There are two new private sector instruments managed by the Export Credit Agency. As of yet, there have been few activities funded, partly due to complicated rules and partly due to the recent launch of these instruments.

51 The *krona* (SEK) is the Swedish currency.

Government's relationship with civil society

The application processes for Sida grants took a lot of time and effort for many Swedish CSOs in 2025. According to a survey carried out by four civil society platforms, **more than two thirds of CSOs were negatively impacted by the redesign of the grant process. After contract terminations were announced in 2024 without valid grounds or risk- and impact analysis, large-grant contract periods were extended until September 2025 after protests.** Multiple changes during the selection process to rules on grant volumes, co-funding requirements and eligibility caused significant problems in many organisations' partner relations, donor relations and staff contracts. Transparency, fairness and the efficient use of time and resources were particularly undermined in the experience of a few organisations. Examples include party-affiliated foundations first being eligible for the civil society strategy and then having the rules changed to exclude them at a late stage of the selection process. Also, Islamic Relief Sweden was denied a humanitarian partnership after a process lacking transparency in the application of criteria.

Civil society was critical of the lack of structured, informed dialogue before the new development policy and the new civil society strategy were adopted in 2024. **In 2025, dialogue improved in some areas.** Overall, Sweden has several spaces for regular dialogue between government and civil society and dialogue continues, but could be strengthened.

Recommendations

→ **Set a clear path back to the 1% of GNI commitment** with gradual, annual increases to arrive at 1% by 2030.

→ **Urgently increase the share of Swedish development assistance which supports people living in poverty** and under oppression in lower-income and least developed countries, fragile states and regions severely affected by climate change.

→ **Work with civil society, academia and other development actors to promote evidence-based theories** of change and comply with principles of effective development cooperation, human rights, and humanitarian principles and law, avoiding ODA allocations based on export promotion and migration control purposes.

→ **Increase the share of Swedish development assistance allocated to gender equality** to reverse the current downward trend in this area and ensure that Swedish priority areas such as human rights and democracy, a strong civil society, child rights, health and sexual and reproductive health and rights , etc. are adequately resourced.

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NETWORKS

- actalliance eu
- actionaid
- ADRA
- Alliance 2015 — towards the eradication of poverty
- care
- caritas europa
- ChildFund Alliance
- CIDSE — Together for global justice
- eucord network
- GNDR
- Habitat for Humanity
- humanity & inclusion
- IJM
- IPPF EN
- LIGHT FOR THE WORLD
- OXFAM
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- Save the Children
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